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DOES THE PUBLIC CARE HOW THE SUPREME
COURT REASONS? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT AND
NORMATIVE CONCERNS IN THE CASE OF
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE*
COURTNEY MEGAN CAHILL** & GEOFFREY CHRISTOPHER RAPP***
Can the Supreme Court influence the public’s reception of
decisions vindicating rights in high-salience contexts, like samesex marriage, by reasoning in one way over another? Will the
people’s disagreement with those decisions—and, by extension,
societal backlash against them—be dampened if the Court
deploys universalizing liberty rationales rather than
essentializing equality rationales? Finally, even if Supreme Court
reasoning does resonate with the people as a descriptive matter,
should the Court minimize anxiety-producing characteristics in
decisions vindicating civil rights—such as homosexuality in the
marriage-equality context—simply in order to assuage the
people?
This Article combines constitutional theory and empirical legal
analysis to ask and answer each of these questions. It uses the
Supreme Court’s disposition of a marriage-equality issue in
United States v. Windsor as an opportunity to test empirically a
theoretical claim made most recently by Professor Kenji
Yoshino, namely that the Court’s reasoning in high-salience
contexts resonates with the people. Yoshino was not the first to
argue that Supreme Court reasoning matters to the public or that
the Court ought to decide cases in a certain way in order to
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influence the public’s reception of its decisions. He was, however,
the first to argue that the Court ought to lead with liberty (rather
than with equality) in a variety of contexts involving group-based
civil rights because of liberty’s putative power to satisfy the
people.
Skeptical of Yoshino’s positive claim and troubled by his
strategic advice to courts, we subjected his theory to empirical
analysis by way of a national experiment. We conducted our
experiment in May 2013—two months after oral argument in
Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry, when the issue of same-sex
marriage was fresh in the public’s mind—to determine whether
the Court’s reasoning in a fictional same-sex marriage case
affects the public. Consistent with our intuition, we did not find
broad support for the notion that reasoning resonates with the
people. Based in part on our results and in part on our normative
reservations with Yoshino’s tactical advice, we believe that judges
and commentators ought to approach Yoshino’s suggested
strategy with restraint.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 2013, the United States Supreme Court struck down
section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”)1 and declined
to rule on the merits in California’s “Proposition 8” case,2 leaving in
place a district court ruling striking down California’s same-sex
marriage prohibition on federal constitutional grounds.3 These two
decisions are considered victories for marriage equality.4 They also
virtually guarantee that in the not-too-distant future the United States
Supreme Court will be asked to elaborate its view of the
constitutionality of state laws restricting marriage to opposite-sex
couples.5
Let us suppose that the not-too-distant future is today and that
the Supreme Court finds that same-sex marriage prohibitions are

1. See generally United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (striking down
section 3 of DOMA as a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). Section
3 of DOMA defined marriage in cross-sex terms for the purpose of federal benefits.
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 2419 (1996) (codified at
1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)).
2. See generally Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (dismissing
petitioners’ appeal for lack of standing under Article III, thereby reinstating the lower
court’s decision striking down California’s exclusionary marriage initiative on federal
constitutional grounds).
3. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (striking down
a state constitutional marriage exclusion as a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses).
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weise, San Francisco Celebrates Gay Marriage Rulings, USA
TODAY (July 5, 2013, 12:51 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/
06/26/san-francisco-celebrates-gay-marriage-ruling/2461259/ (noting that “[a]fter both
[Windsor and Hollingsworth] were announced, a line of politicians and gay activists . . . let
out a roar of approval”).
5. Dan Levine, U.S. High Court Ruling Sets Up New Wave of Gay Marriage Battles,
CHI. TRIB. (June 26, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-06-26/news/sns-rt-usagayrightscampaignsl2n0f21jd-20130626_1_marriage-ban-marriage-rights-gay-marriage; see
also Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127
HARV. L. REV. 127, 158 (2013) (“Within a few years of Windsor, as public support for gay
marriage continues to increase and as more states enact it into law, one can imagine some
Justices being tempted to extend that ruling to forbid the states from excluding same-sex
couples from marriage. Indeed, the Windsor dissents of both Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Scalia seem mostly addressed to that eventuality . . . .”).
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unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution.6 Would the
constitutional basis or bases on which such a decision rests matter to
most people? Would people care whether the Court rendered a promarriage-equality decision on equal protection grounds or on
fundamental rights grounds? Does how the Court reasons in cases
dealing with culturally contested issues like same-sex marriage
resonate with the public? Or, will the public either embrace or oppose
a Supreme Court decision in such cases regardless of the reasons that
the Court offers in support of it?
This paper combines empirical legal analysis and constitutional
theory to begin to probe these (and related) questions. It presents an
original empirical study on the relationship between judicial
reasoning and public reception of a court decision.7 Its objective is
part descriptive and part normative. Descriptively, it argues that
judicial reasoning likely does not matter to the people, contrary to the
claims of some legal commentators.8 Normatively, it argues that
courts ought not to reason in one way over another in a certain subset
of decisions vindicating group-based civil rights simply to alleviate the
anxiety those decisions might provoke in the general public, as one
prominent constitutional theorist, Kenji Yoshino, has recently
suggested.9
In the past, scholars of constitutional law have been concerned
with what the Supreme Court should have said, but did not, in
6. A number of cases have been filed in the aftermath of Windsor and Hollingsworth
challenging state same-sex marriage bans in both state and federal court; it is at the very
least possible that one of them will find its way to the Supreme Court of the United States.
See, e.g., Bishop v. U.S. ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014)
(striking down Oklahoma’s constitutional marriage ban on federal equal protection
grounds), aff’d, Nos. 14-5003, 14-5006, 2014 WL 3537847 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014); Kitchen
v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013) (striking down Utah’s constitutional
and statutory marriage ban on federal due process and equal protection grounds), aff’d,
755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014). During its October 2014 Term, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari for all cases arising from challenges to state laws banning same-sex marriage,
which left a split among the states regarding the issue. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d
648, 653 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d
1193, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760
F.3d 352, 367–68 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014); Bishop v. Smith, 760
F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014).
7. Our study contributes to a growing body of empirical research undertaken by
political scientists on the relationship between decision attributes and public opinion. See,
e.g., James R. Zink, James F. Spriggs II & John T. Scott, Courting the Public: The
Influence of Decision Attributes on Individuals’ Views of Court Opinions, 71 J. POL. 909,
910 (2009) (testing whether decisions with larger majorities and that follow precedent
positively influence public opinion).
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part VI.
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landmark constitutional decisions like Brown v. Board of Education10
and Roe v. Wade.11 Increasingly, scholars of constitutional law are
interested in elaborating on how the Supreme Court should reason in
potential future landmark cases, including a marriage-equality
decision.12 Why is this?
Scholars have offered several reasons for why the Court’s
reasoning matters, particularly in cases involving deeply divisive
issues like desegregation, abortion, and same-sex marriage. For some,
the Court’s reasoning matters because it could impact a decision’s
precedential value.13 For others, the Court’s reasoning matters
because it could strengthen the constitutional basis for a particular
right.14 For still others, the Court’s reasoning matters because it could
10. See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down laws separating the races in
public education as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).
11. See generally 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down Texas’s criminal abortion law and
finding that the abortion right is protected as an aspect of privacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause). For a sampling of this scholarly commentary, see, for
example, ANITA L. ALLEN ET AL., WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 18–22 (Jack
M. Balkin ed. 2005) (summarizing the authors’ revised opinions of Roe and noting that
they “took a variety of different approaches to answer [the book’s central] question of
what Roe v. Wade should have said”), and BRUCE ACKERMAN ET AL., WHAT BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2001) (noting that a
group of constitutional scholars was asked how they would “have written the Brown
opinion”).
12. See generally Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747
(2011) [hereinafter Yoshino, The New Equal Protection] (theorizing how the Supreme
Court should reason); Kenji Yoshino, Tribe, 42 TULSA L. REV. 961 (2007) [hereinafter
Yoshino, Tribe] (theorizing how the Supreme Court should reason). Professor Yoshino’s
theory is elaborated more fully below. See infra Part I.
13. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 282–85
(1996). Consider here Brown v. Board of Education, which held that state-mandated
separation of the races in public education was unconstitutional because it made African
American schoolchildren feel inferior to whites. 347 U.S. at 494. The Brown Court has
been criticized not for the result that it reached but rather for the reasoning on which that
result rests—reasoning that putatively lacks “neutral principles” with clear applicability
outside the public education context. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22 (1959) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
decision to extend its Brown “ruling to other public facilities, such as public
transportation, parks, golf courses, bath houses, and beaches, which no one is obliged to
use––all by per curiam decisions” is not necessarily a “principled” one given Brown’s
context-specific reasoning). If separate-but-equal was unconstitutional in public education
because of how it made African American schoolchildren feel, then what of separate-butequal on public golf courses—or in any other context in which that repudiated legal
doctrine was the law of the land? See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS 321 (2004) (discussing the cases extending Brown’s holding to other contexts as
well as contemporary criticism of them).
14. Consider here Roe v. Wade, which struck down Texas’s criminal abortion law on
due process grounds and found that the federal Constitution protects the abortion right
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help to contain the backlash that particular decisions produce in the
court of public opinion.15 It is the conjectured relationship between
judicial reasoning and public reception of a decision (and backlash
against it) that concerns us here. In particular, we are interested in the
recent argument advanced by Kenji Yoshino––namely, that courts
can minimize the people’s pluralism anxiety, defined as
“apprehension of and about . . . demographic diversity,”16 by
vindicating civil rights on liberty rather than on equality grounds.17 To
be sure, Professor Yoshino is not the first to argue that courts can
influence the public’s reception of (and backlash against) judicial

under the larger rubric of privacy. 410 U.S. at 164. Many commentators have argued that
the Roe Court should have supported its holding on equality grounds because equality is a
better constitutional basis for abortion rights than is privacy, given that privacy is
mentioned nowhere in the Constitution whereas equality is and given that abortion laws
affect women in both sex-specific and sex-stereotypical ways. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 981 (1984) (arguing that
abortion laws violate the Equal Protection Clause because they create a sex
classification—only women can have an abortion because only women can get pregnant);
see also Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Equality Arguments for Abortion Rights, 60
UCLA L. REV. DISC. 160, 170 (2013) (arguing for a “synthetic understanding of the
constitutional basis of the abortion right—as grounded in both liberty and equality
values”); Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 816 (2007) (outlining
the “constitutional arguments that have been advanced in a variety of doctrinal
frameworks” in favor of a “sex equality approach to reproductive rights”); Reva B. Siegel,
The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion
Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 994 (arguing that “[a]n abortion ban reflecting and
enforcing [gender stereotypes] violates constitutional guarantees of equal citizenship”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to Pornography,
Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 36 (1992) (making the sex stereotype
argument against restrictive abortion laws). Moreover, had the Court justified the
abortion right on equality grounds, the abortion right would be secure even if Roe were
reversed. See Reva B. Siegel, Concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID
63, 63 (Jack M. Balkin ed. 2005). Roe also illustrates how the Court’s reasoning in a
particular decision can affect that decision’s precedential scope, as discussed earlier in the
context of Brown. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Had Roe been decided on
equality grounds, some commentators maintain, it could have been strong authority for
why the government’s refusal to cover even medically necessary abortions for indigent
women was unconstitutional, even though the Court held otherwise in cases after Roe. See,
e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (holding that the abortion right does not
require the state to fund non-therapeutic abortions of Medicaid recipients).
15. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 796–97 (arguing that the
Supreme Court can “fashion a new, more inclusive sense of ‘we’ ” by reasoning in one way
over another in decisions addressing issues that might otherwise provoke the people’s
“pluralism anxiety”).
16. Id. at 751.
17. Id. at 750 (arguing that the “liberty-based dignity claim” is a “way for the Court to
‘do’ equality in an era of increasing pluralism anxiety”).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 303 (2015)

2015]

PUBLIC VIEWS OF JUDICIAL REASONING

309

decisions by reasoning in one way over another in their opinions.18
Most notably, Justice Ginsburg has argued that “[t]he Roe decision
might have been less of a storm center had it . . . homed in more
precisely on the women’s equality dimension of the issue.”19 Under
this view, justifying the abortion right on equality rather than on
privacy grounds might have muted Roe’s ostensible social and
political backlash20—at least among academics but possibly among
the public as well—because people would have been more willing to
accept (or at least tolerate) abortion had they understood the deep
relationship between a woman’s reproductive autonomy and her
“ability to stand in relation to man, society, and the state as an
independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen.”21
Yoshino is, however, the first to argue that courts should
foreground liberty and minimize equality in a whole swath of cases
involving group-based civil rights. In his view, liberty justifications for
civil rights—of the sort relied on by the Supreme Court in Lawrence
v. Texas22—can dampen the angst that equality justifications

18. Justice Ginsburg has argued that by avoiding “giant strides” in constitutional
adjudication, a court can reduce the risk of producing a “backlash too forceful to contain.”
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1208 (1992)
[hereinafter Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice].
19. Id. at 1200; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and
Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 382 (1985) [hereinafter
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade]
(arguing that “[a]cademic criticism of Roe . . . might have been less pointed had the Court
placed the woman alone, rather than the woman tied to her physician, at the center of its
attention”). But see id. at 382 (“I do not pretend that, if the Court had added a distinct sex
discrimination theme to its medically oriented opinion, the storm Roe generated would
have been less furious.”).
20. We say “ostensible” because the Roe backlash thesis—the claim that Roe
precipitated backlash against both the abortion right and the Court—has recently
undergone serious critique. See LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V.
WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT’S RULING 253 (2010) (questioning the Roe backlash thesis); Linda Greenhouse &
Reva B. Siegel, Backlash to the Future? From Roe to Perry, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 240,
242 (2013) [hereinafter Greenhouse & Siegel, Backlash to the Future?] (questioning “the
one-dimensional story of court-centered backlash so often attributed to Roe”); Linda
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About
Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2030–31 (2011) (raising “questions about the conventional
assumption that the Court’s decision in Roe is responsible for political polarization over
abortion”).
21. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade,
supra note 19, at 383 (citing Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 57–59 (1977)).
22. See generally 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas’s criminal sodomy law on
due process grounds and finding that the federal Constitution protects a limited right to
sexual autonomy).
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ostensibly provoke (or at least do nothing to alleviate) in the general
public.23 We describe Yoshino’s theory in greater detail in Part I.
Suffice it to say here that Yoshino contends that pluralism anxiety is a
good reason why the Court should continue to vindicate civil rights on
liberty rather than on equality grounds, as it did in Lawrence.24 While
“liberty claims [might not] quash [pluralism] anxiety altogether,”
Yoshino admits, they “do so more than equality claims.”25 Assuming
“courts . . . believe something is at stake in how [civil rights] claims
are framed,”26 he argues, they ought to follow Lawrence’s lead of
vindicating rights on the basis of liberty rather than equality.27 In this
sense, Yoshino advances the conversation initiated by other scholars
about the Court’s ability to influence the public’s reception of its
decisions. Cass Sunstein has argued that the Court can limit public
backlash by deciding “minimally.”28 Other commentators have argued
that the Court can control public backlash by not deciding at all.29
Yoshino appears to suggest that the Court can alleviate the people’s
pluralism anxiety—and, by extension, control public backlash30—by
deciding in a certain way. Indeed, we interpret Yoshino’s pluralism-

23. See infra Part I.
24. Yoshino made this argument before its appearance in the Harvard Law Review.
See, e.g., Yoshino, Tribe, supra note 12, passim (setting forth his pluralism anxiety theory
in a symposium tribute to Laurence Tribe); Kenji Yoshino, Gerken-Yoshino Debate on
Liberty and Equality, Round 2, SLATE (May 22, 2008, 10:17 AM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/convictions/2008/05/22/gerken_yoshino_debate_on_liberty_and_equality_round_2.ht
ml [hereinafter Yoshino Debate].
25. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 794.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 778 (praising Lawrence’s liberty rationale as one that “quieted pluralism
anxiety”).
28. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 4–6 (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME]; Cass R.
Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–8 (1996)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided].
29. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 13, at 6–7 (describing how courts can avoid public
backlash); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation Has
Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV. 275, 278 (2013) (using
pluralism reinforcing theory to argue when courts should and should not incite backlash);
Michael J. Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter?, 83
GEO. L.J. 433, 433 n.4 (1994) [hereinafter Klarman, Civil Rights Law] (discussing the
Brown “backlash thesis”); Michael Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81, 117–18 (1994) [hereinafter Klarman, How Brown
Changed Race Relations]; Michael Klarman, Harvard Law School, Hart Lecture at
Georgetown Law Center: Courts, Social Change, and Political Backlash (Mar. 31, 2011)
[hereinafter Klarman Lecture] (discussing the disruptive backlash that resulted from
judicial decisions in high-salience contexts like desegregation and marriage equality).
30. For a description of the relationship between pluralism anxiety and backlash, see
infra notes 78–91 and accompanying text.
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anxiety theory as a backlash-minimizing device, as pluralism anxiety
is a necessary condition for public backlash to occur. We describe the
relationship between pluralism anxiety and backlash in greater detail
below.31
But do the people—the group whose pluralism anxiety Yoshino
appears to care about the most—believe that something is at stake in
the way civil rights claims are framed? Will Americans be more
willing to accept a Supreme Court decision vindicating marriage
equality for same-sex couples if that decision is grounded in liberty,
“emphasiz[ing] what all Americans . . . have in common,” rather than
in equality?32 Our study empirically tests the claim that how the Court
reasons in decisions vindicating civil rights actually matters to the
public. We chose to test Yoshino’s particular theory of “pluralism
anxiety” because he is the first to argue that the “how” matters in any
case involving group-based civil rights—as opposed to, say, Justice
Ginsburg, who has more modestly suggested that the “how” might
have mattered in the abortion context specifically.33 Moreover, we
thought it was important to subject Yoshino’s theory to empirical
study because Yoshino provides no evidence to substantiate his claim
that the Supreme Court’s reasoning actually resonates with the
people. This oversight is curious, especially given that reasoning’s
ostensible relevance constitutes the very basis for Yoshino’s principal
normative argument (the one with which we have strong normative
reservations), namely that courts ought to foreground liberty in
decisions vindicating group-based civil rights.34

31. See infra note 78–91 and accompanying text.
32. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 796.
33. In fact, Yoshino and Ginsburg differ in an even more fundamental way than the
relative scope and applicability of their theories. Whereas Yoshino argues that libertybased rationales are more appealing to the public, Ginsburg argues that an equality-based
rationale for the abortion right specifically would have been more appealing to the public.
Compare Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 792–94 (arguing that
liberty-based rationales “may appeal to the libertarian streak in some conservatives” and
generally have a greater “effect on quieting pluralism anxiety” than equality-based
rationales), with Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, supra note 18, at 1200 (“The Roe
decision might have been less of a storm center had it [] homed in more precisely on the
women’s equality dimension of the issue . . . .”). She roots this belief in the fact that
starting in the 1970s, the public was very supportive of Supreme Court decisions striking
down sex-specific laws on equality grounds. See Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice,
supra note 18, at 1200.
34. This oversight is also curious in light of existing empirical accounts of Supreme
Court opinions and the American public—accounts which suggest that “large portions of
the American public are unaware even of major decisions like Roe v. Wade.” Gerald N.
Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L. REV. 563, 567 (2009); see also NATHANIAL
PERSILY, JACK CITRIN & PATRICK J. EGAN, PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
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For reasons explained below, our initial intuition was that the
Court’s reasoning in constitutional cases involving divisive issues like
same-sex marriage and abortion would not quiet any pluralism
anxiety or contain any backlash35 that those cases produce. If the
Supreme Court as an institution does not cause a distinctive backlash
in the public—as scholars David Fontana and Donald Braman have
recently found36—then our intuition was that the Supreme Court
could not contain backlash through the reasoning that it employs.
In 2012, Professors Fontana and Braman published the findings
of an empirical study on institutional backlash.37 Their findings
arguably cast doubt on Yoshino’s thesis, but they do not actually test
it.38 In brief, Fontana and Braman examined whether the public
reacted more strongly when the Court decided an ideologically
divisive issue like same-sex marriage than when Congress decided
that issue.39 Conventional wisdom on backlash posits that the Court,
because of its intrinsic institutional features and the so-called
“counter-majoritarian difficulty,”40 causes a distinctive backlash in the
court of public opinion.41 Fontana and Braman found that this was
not the case, and that people’s “cultural priors,” rather than any preexisting institutional preference, best predicted how they would react

CONTROVERSY 8 (2008) (surveying empirical data that overwhelmingly suggest that
“Supreme Court decisions had no effect on the overall distribution of [the American]
public opinion”).
35. We discuss the relationship between pluralism anxiety and backlash below. See
infra notes 76–91 and accompanying text.
36. David Fontana & Donald Braman, Judicial Backlash or Just Backlash?, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 731, 735 (2012) [hereinafter Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash]
(reporting the results of a national survey that tested whether the public was less
supportive of rights-enhancing decisions if they were issued by the Supreme Court rather
than by Congress); see also Donald Braman & David Fontana, The New Republic:
Supreme Anxiety, NPR (Jan. 19, 2012, 9:02 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/01/19/
145445550/the-new-republic-supreme-anxiety [hereinafter Braman & Fontana, Supreme
Anxiety] (summarizing the Columbia Law Review piece for a more wide-spread audience).
37. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 735.
38. Professors Fontana and Braman empirically tested whether it matters to the
public if Congress or the Supreme Court decides a high salience issue like same-sex
marriage, not whether it matters to the public if the Court decides a high salience issue in a
particular way. See id. at 734–35 (summarizing their study and its results).
39. Id. at 734.
40. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962) (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a
counter-majoritarian force in our system.”).
41. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 740–41.
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to the resolution of a high-salience issue by either the Court or
Congress.42
Our study, like Fontana and Braman’s, experimentally tests a
common constitutional law claim, albeit on a more granular level.
Whereas Fontana and Braman focus on whether the Supreme Court
causes a distinctive public backlash,43 we focus here on whether the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in cases dealing with divisive issues like
same-sex marriage contains public backlash. Whereas Fontana and
Braman focus on whether the public cares if the Supreme Court
decides important constitutional law issues,44 we focus here on
whether the public cares if the Supreme Court employs particular
justifications over others when deciding those issues—and, more
narrowly, when deciding those issues in a way that ultimately
vindicates a constitutional right.
We chose to focus on the issue of same-sex marriage for three
reasons. First, Yoshino contends that leading with liberty in a
marriage case would be more appealing to the public.45 Second, the
issue of same-sex marriage, considered in June 2013 by the Supreme
Court in two high-profile cases and currently under review in a
number of state and federal courts,46 is very much in the public eye.
Moreover, Michael Klarman recently argued that a Supreme Court
decision establishing a national marriag- equality precedent—the socalled “ ‘fifty state’ solution”—is well within the realm of possibility
for the near future.47 Thus, we believe that the time is ripe to test the
public’s response to such a precedent. Third, our normative
reservations with Yoshino’s theory center on that theory’s application
to the class of people most directly affected by a same-sex marriage
decision: sexual minorities.
Our results, explained at greater length in the Parts that follow,
did not overcome our intuition that the precise reasoning employed
by the Court (when vindicating a civil right like same-sex marriage)
has little impact on the public. While we found some evidence that
the public is less likely to accept a same-sex marriage decision
justified on equality grounds than one justified on liberty grounds or

42. Id. at 746 (“[W]e find in our study that cultural priors are much stronger
predictors of behavior than other attitudinal priors.”).
43. See id. at 742.
44. Id. at 734.
45. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 793–94.
46. See supra notes 2–3, 6 and accompanying text.
47. See Klarman, supra note 5, at 128 (referring to the “ ‘fifty-state’ solution” of
identifying “a federal constitutional right to same-sex marriage”).
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which contains no justification at all, we did not find robust evidence
in support of that proposition—certainly not robust enough to
overcome our initial skepticism of Yoshino’s theory. Importantly,
even if we had found a robust relationship between equality-based
reasoning and decreased support for a Supreme Court decision
vindicating marriage for same-sex couples, we would still reject
Yoshino’s tactical advice to courts for normative reasons.
More specifically, we believe that Yoshino’s tactical advice
constitutes a form of judicial covering, defined as “ton[ing] down a
disfavored identity to fit into the mainstream.”48 We find it curious
that Yoshino, who has written eloquently on the subject of covering
and who has criticized the covering demands that the law places on
sexual minorities in particular,49 would advocate what we construe to
be a form of judicial covering. The Supreme Court’s most recent gayrights decision, United States v. Windsor, engages in a similar sort of
judicial covering that we find objectionable.50 We elaborate on this
normative critique and on Windsor in Part VI.
It is our position that courts ought to reject Yoshino’s theory on
normative grounds alone. That said, we are aware that courts likely
care about how the public receives their decisions51 and might
therefore be tempted by Yoshino’s suggestion that liberty alleviates
the anxiety that equality provokes. With that possibility in mind, it is
our hope that the results of our study at the very least prompt courts
to approach Yoshino’s tactical advice with restraint. Our study found

48. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS ix
(2006) [hereinafter YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT].
49. See generally YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT, supra note 48
(criticizing the covering demands that the law places on sexual minorities); Kenji Yoshino,
Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) [hereinafter Yoshino, Covering] (explaining the
problem of judicial covering). Yoshino has also written about the law’s erasure of sexual
minorities. See generally Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The
Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 487 (1998)
(arguing that the assimilationist bias contained in immutability and visibility factors of
equal protection jurisprudence should be retired); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract
of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000) (seeking to explain why bisexuals are
erased in society).
50. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013); see infra notes 233–39 and
accompanying text.
51. For opposing views on this question, compare Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins,
Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515,
1516 (2010) (“Supreme Court Justices care more about the views of academics, journalists,
and other elites than they do about public opinion.”), with BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL
OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND
SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 367–68 (2009) (arguing that the Supreme
Court is responsive to public opinion in its decisionmaking).
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that there is probably little to lose as a positive matter should courts
foreground equality over liberty in a same-sex marriage decision. It is
our contention, however, that there is quite a bit to lose as a
normative matter should courts go that route.
Part I sets forth in greater detail Yoshino’s pluralism-anxiety
theory, and Part II discusses our positive reservations with it. Part III
describes our methodology, Part IV reports our results, and Part V
offers discussion. Part VI closes with the normative reservations that
prompted us to undertake this study in the first place.
I. THE THEORY: MINIMIZING PLURALISM ANXIETY WITH LIBERTY
Kenji Yoshino is not the first person to suggest that Supreme
Court reasoning in any particular decision can affect the way in which
that decision is received by various constituencies outside the Court.52
He is, however, the first person to argue that the Court ought to
foreground liberty rationales in any decision vindicating civil rights on
the theory that liberty is more likely than equality to quell the
“pluralism anxiety” that any such decision will provoke in the
“people.”53 Our study is limited to testing an important—and until
now untested—aspect of this more specific claim. Before turning to it,
a more complete description of Yoshino’s theory and of our positive
reservations with it is necessary.
Yoshino’s theory has both a descriptive and a normative
dimension, both of which center on what he calls “pluralism
anxiety.”54 Defined as the country’s “apprehension of and about its
demographic diversity,”55 pluralism anxiety is weighing all of us down.
Citing the work of political scientist and Bowling Alone author,
Robert Putnam, Yoshino argues that increased racial, ethnic, and
sexual diversity in the United States has led to decreased “social
solidarity and . . . social capital.”56 While we might “celebrate

52. See supra notes 13–21 and accompanying text.
53. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 794. Like Yoshino, other
scholars have argued against using equality-based and identity-based reasoning. See, e.g.,
Jessica Knouse, From Identity Politics to Ideology Politics, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 749, 785.
54. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 751.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 752 n.37 (citing Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and
Community in the Twenty-First Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 138 (2007)
[hereinafter Putnam, E Pluribus Unum]). Putnam is the author of the landmark book
Bowling Alone, which posited a link between increasing diversity in the United States and
decreasing “social capital.” ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 352 (2000). Putnam’s
studies are limited to ethnic and racial diversity, see Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note
56, at 138–39, whereas Yoshino posits that diversity generally—including gender diversity
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diversity” in theory,57 we are exhausted by it in fact—so much so that
we are experiencing “less happiness and lower perceived quality of
life”58 and desiring “a recommitment to the ideals of assimilation and
integration.”59
No less than it is affecting “we, the people,” pluralism anxiety is
affecting the Supreme Court. “Just as the War on Terror has
transformed our separation of powers jurisprudence and the internet
has transformed our First Amendment obscenity jurisprudence,”
Yoshino argues, “pluralism anxiety has pressed the Court away from
traditional group-based identity politics in its equal protection and
free exercise jurisprudence.”60 Pluralism anxiety explains why the
Court has placed limitations on heightened scrutiny classifications,61
why the Court has foreclosed pure disparate impact claims under the
Constitution’s equality and free exercise guarantees,62 and why the
Court has reined in Congress’s exercise of its enforcement power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 In “each line of
jurisprudence,” Yoshino observes, the Court “has alluded to
pluralism anxiety,” thereby suggesting that its exhaustion with
identity politics is driving it to close “three separate doors through
which it had permitted the advancement of group-based civil rights
under the Equal Protection Clause.”64 As a result, and at first blush,
“[t]he future of constitutional civil rights . . . seems grim.”65
Not so grim, however, as to suggest that “we are witnessing the
end of constitutional civil rights in this country.”66 Yoshino argues
that to compensate for the closure of various equality doors, the
Court has turned to liberty—or, more precisely, to liberty-based
dignity claims—when vindicating civil rights. While the Court “seems
to understand pluralism as a challenge to a progressive agenda,”
Yoshino remarks, “it has seen that challenge as one that can be
overcome by using liberty analysis, which draws on a broader, more

and sexual diversity—might be contributing to pluralism anxiety, see Yoshino, The New
Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 747 (discussing diversity broadly in terms of religious,
racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual diversity).
57. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 754.
58. Id. at 753 (quoting Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 56, at 150).
59. Id. at 752.
60. Id. at 755 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 755–63.
62. Id. at 763–68.
63. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 768–73.
64. Id. at 774.
65. Id. at 776.
66. See id.
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inclusive form of ‘we.’ ”67 Unlike essentializing equality claims, liberty
claims can bridge the differences between us, sounding as they do in a
“universal register.”68 He says:
The new equal protection paradigm stresses the interests we
have in common as human beings rather than the demographic
differences that drive us apart. In this sense, the shift from the
“old” to the “new” equal protection could be seen as a
movement from group-based civil rights to universal human
rights.69
To exemplify this shift from the “old” to the “new” equal
protection, Yoshino offers Lawrence v. Texas,70 in which the Supreme
Court struck down Texas’s sodomy statute on liberty rather than on
equality grounds.71 There, Yoshino reminds us, the Court reasoned
that “the statute violated the fundamental right of all persons—
straight, gay, or otherwise—to control their intimate sexual
relations.”72 In Yoshino’s view, the Court decided Lawrence on a
liberty theory because of its exhaustion with the “old” equality
“paradigm.”73 He claims that “by deciding Lawrence on liberty
grounds, the Court quieted pluralism anxiety.”74
When Yoshino says that the Lawrence Court “quieted pluralism
anxiety,” presumably he means that it quieted the public’s anxiety,75
67. Id.
68. Id. at 793.
69. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 793.
70. Id. at 776 (citing 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
71. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down Texas’s sodomy
statute on federal due process grounds); id. at 575 (explaining the inadequacies of striking
down Texas’s sodomy statute on federal equal protection grounds).
72. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 777.
73. See id. at 777–78. For a more tempered reading of the Lawrence Court’s turn
toward liberty, see Russell K. Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1809,
1827 (2007) (reviewing YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT, supra note 48, and
stating that “[t]he cases [Yoshino] cites as leading the way toward his liberty-based model
are also revealing. To the extent that Lawrence v. Texas . . . discussed liberty or
universality, [its] actual holding[] clearly benefited outsiders, with hardly any impact on
insiders.” (citations omitted)).
74. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 778. Some commentators
have argued that Lawrence was more polarizing than Yoshino suggests. See, e.g., Patrick J.
Egan & Nathaniel Persily, Court Decisions and Trends in Support for Same-Sex Marriage,
THE POLLING REPORT, Aug. 2009, at 1, 6 (discussing the backlash that Lawrence initially
precipitated).
75. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 778. A plausible but less
compelling interpretation would be that Yoshino meant to describe the effect of the
Court’s opinion on pluralism anxiety among elites (such as political and media elites).
Even if that is the case (perhaps suggested by who would be making a “charge” against the
Court), the reason why elite reaction might matter is that it can shape public reaction.
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given that he immediately follows that assertion by saying: “The
Court evaded the charge that it was picking and choosing among
groups by highlighting that the right in question belonged to all
persons within the United States.”76 In other words, Yoshino suggests
that liberty not only minimizes the Court’s pluralism anxiety, but also
inoculates the Court from the “charge” that it is playing favorites
among identity groups.77
Even more, Yoshino suggests that liberty is the judicial antidote
to the people’s pluralism angst, and for that reason might help to
contain any backlash that Court decisions vindicating the rights of
minority groups are thought to precipitate.78 Although Yoshino does
not explicitly say so, his theory suggests that courts might play a role
in containing the public’s backlash in culturally contested cases—like
same-sex marriage, the focus of our study—by reasoning one way
over another. To be sure, pluralism anxiety and backlash are distinct
concepts; the former denotes an uncomfortable feeling, whereas the
latter denotes a strong reaction against something (such as a court
decision or a court itself) that can have negative consequences.79
Yoshino’s pluralism anxiety is a feeling provoked by the increasing
diversity in society, whereas backlash is an antagonistic reaction
provoked by judicial decisions.80 At least on its face, then, Yoshino’s
pluralism-anxiety theory does not directly tell us anything about
backlash or about the Court’s ability to contain backlash through its
reasoning.
76. Id. at 777–78.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 754 (arguing that “the United States Supreme Court might help
create . . . ‘[a] new, broader sense of “we” ’ ” through its constitutional jurisprudence
(quoting Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 56, at 139)).
79. The term “backlash” is susceptible to multiple interpretations. We argue that
backlash involves mobilized political action to reverse and/or erode a judicial decision.
While a lack of “acceptance” or “agreement” with a decision is not the same as backlash,
acceptance of a decision (or agreement with it) would seem to deny the field of battle to
elites seeking to create a public backlash (or at least to make it harder for them to achieve
victory on it). For a more complete definition of backlash and a history of its use in law,
see Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 388–91 (2007).
80. To be sure, it does not have to be judicial decisions, see Greenhouse & Siegel,
Backlash to the Future?, supra note 20, at 243 n.2 (“Backlash . . . is not limited to courts.”),
although conventional wisdom says that courts provoke backlash to a much greater degree
than the two politically accountable branches, see id. (“The premise of the Roe backlash
narrative is that there is something about the judicial declaration of minority rights that
produces an especially virulent and polarizing reaction among losers who would not
respond in a similar fashion to legislative defeat.”). Recent empirical findings suggest that
this conventional wisdom may be wrong. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra
note 36, passim.
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On close inspection, however, Yoshino’s theory indirectly posits
a connection among pluralism anxiety, backlash, and judicial
reasoning. An uncomfortable feeling, such as one emanating from
pluralism anxiety, might be thought of as a necessary, but perhaps not
sufficient, condition for backlash. The public, feeling uncomfortable,
can be targeted for mobilization by elites, and that mobilization, by
focusing reaction on a Court decision, ripens into backlash. The more
the public is persuaded by an opinion, however, the less anxious it
feels about the opinion—and the less likely it is to backlash against it.
Liberty, in Yoshino’s view, performs that persuasive function. He
says: “The universality of [liberty] claims will make them more
persuasive [than equality claims] to many.”81 If backlash can occur
when people are not persuaded by judicial decisions, then liberty
presumably minimizes backlash (at least vis-à-vis equality) because it
makes decisions “more persuasive” to the polity than equality can.82
Indeed, for Yoshino, there is something about liberty that makes
people more likely to agree with a judicial decision or to accept it as
law. A decision justified using liberty (rather than equality) is less
likely to trigger backlash, either against the decision or the Court that
rendered it.
It is for this reason that we interpret Yoshino’s pluralism-anxiety
theory as a backlash-limiting mechanism. Where other constitutional
theorists have argued that the Court can limit backlash either by
deciding “minimally”83 or by not deciding at all (at least sometimes),84
Yoshino appears to be suggesting that the Court can contain backlash
by deciding in a certain way.
Importantly, we do not read Yoshino as offering a complete
explanation for the complicated process associated with backlash

81. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 794.
82. See id. at 794.
83. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 28, at 5; Sunstein, Leaving
Things Undecided, supra note 28, at 8.
84. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 29, at 281–91 (using pluralism reinforcing theory to
argue when courts should and should not incite backlash). See generally KLARMAN, supra
note 13 (arguing that the Court’s narrow decision in Brown did more to encourage
southern white opposition); Klarman, Civil Rights Law, supra note 29 (reviewing MARK
TUSHNET, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT,
1936–1961 (1994), and discussing the Brown “backlash thesis”); Klarman, How Brown
Changed Race Relations, supra note 29 (questioning Brown’s impact and arguing that
Brown encouraged southern resistance to racial change); Klarman Lecture, supra note 29
(discussing the disruptive backlash that resulted from judicial decisions in high-salience
contexts like desegregation and marriage equality).
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against judicial opinions.85 Instead, the “anxiety” he describes
represents a form of immediate or “gut” response to a Court
decision.86 Members of the public may not fully understand a Court
decision yet react negatively to it based on the inclusion of particular
words or concepts in the Court’s explanation for its holding.87 In this
sense, the reaction that Yoshino anticipates to an equality-based
decision resembles the kind of “implicit bias” that has attracted the
serious attention of behavioral psychologists and legal scholars.88 The
reaction Yoshino describes may be an intuitive, yet powerful, one,
and we posit that a fully developed backlash is unlikely to occur
where the public has a positive intuitive response but may occur when
the public’s reaction is intuitively negative.89 We revisit the issue of
implicit bias and its relationship to Yoshino’s pluralism-anxiety
theory in Parts V and VI.
Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that Yoshino does not
consider liberty and equality in a vacuum; rather, his claim is that the
liberty rationale suppresses pluralism anxiety (and possibly backlash)
more than equality. In other words, his theory poses the comparative
question of which mode of reasoning courts ought to choose––liberty
85. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Supreme Court: Judicial Temperament and the Democratic
Ideal, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 8 (2007) (describing backlash as a “complicated
phenomenon”).
86. See Robert A. Garda, The White Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REV.
599, 625 (2011) (describing how anxiety is a manifestation of implicit or unconscious bias).
87. See Deana A. Pollard, Unconscious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a
Qualified Evidentiary Equal Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. U. REV. 913,
918 (1999) (explaining that even those with no conscious bias may react negatively as a
result of subconscious bias).
88. See, e.g., Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124,
1126–28 (2012) [hereinafter Kang, Implicit Bias]; Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing
Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 492–93 (2010);
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1506–12 (2005); Linda
Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination
Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1061 (2006); Linda
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1199–1200,
1209–12 (1995) (discussing anti-discrimination law’s failure to capture implicit bias);
Kristin Lane, Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition and the Law, 3
ANN. REV. L. AND SOC. SCI. 427, 428 (2007); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 318–23
(1987) (discussing anti-discrimination law’s failure to capture unconscious racism); Justin
D. Levinson, Superbias: The Collision of Behavioral Economics and Implicit Social
Cognition, 45 AKRON L. REV. 591, 592–96 (2012); Philip E. Tetlock, Gregory Mitchell &
L. Jason Anastasopoulos, Detecting and Punishing Unconscious Bias, 42 J. LEGAL STUD.
83, 83–84 (2013).
89. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 766 (“[A] base of
support may insulate a Court decision from immediate backlash.”).
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or equality. Under this account, equality does not necessarily provoke
pluralism anxiety (and therefore backlash). Rather, it could simply
fail to alleviate it.90 Nor does liberty completely eliminate pluralism
anxiety, as Yoshino admits.91 As explained in greater detail below,
our results provide limited support for the proposition that equality is
less effective than liberty in garnering support for Supreme Court
decisions vindicating civil rights—and therefore, by implication, less
effective than liberty in curtailing pluralism anxiety.92
If that understanding of Yoshino’s pluralism-anxiety theory is
correct, then his theory is much more than just an explanation for why
the Court has abandoned equality as a basis for vindicating civil
rights. It is also a tactical recommendation for how the Court ought to
decide group-based civil rights cases in the future. Yoshino frames the
article where he presents his theory of pluralism anxiety, The New
Equal Protection, in a way that throws this normative objective into
relief. At the end of Part I of that article, where Yoshino describes
pluralism anxiety, he states: “This Article considers how the United
States Supreme Court might help create [a] ‘new, broader sense of
“we” ’ through its constitutional jurisprudence.”93 In the final
substantive part of his piece, Yoshino gives courts (or really the
Supreme Court) the following advice: “[W]here a claim can be validly
characterized as either a liberty-based or an equality-based dignity
claim, it should be characterized as the former.”94 In other writings
articulating his theory, Yoshino has been clear that his intention is to
convince courts—rather than legislatures or litigators—to lead with
the liberty argument when vindicating civil rights because of its
anxiety-minimizing potential.95 His theory is exclusively juriscentric,
and deliberately so.

90. Such an interpretation, however, is not implausible. If pluralism anxiety causes
people to be less persuaded than they would otherwise be by a judicial decision, if being
less persuaded by a judicial decision could eventually precipitate backlash against both it
and the court that rendered it, and if equality at the very least does nothing to minimize
pluralism anxiety (and might even exacerbate it), then it would be fair to say that equality
rationales, on Yoshino’s view, precipitate backlash more than liberty rationales do.
91. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 794 (acknowledging that
“liberty claims [might not] quash [pluralism] anxiety altogether but . . . they do so more
than equality claims”).
92. See infra Parts IV–VI.
93. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 754 (quoting Putnam, E
Pluribus Unum, supra note 56, at 139).
94. Id. at 792.
95. See, e.g., Yoshino Debate, supra note 24 (arguing that “the fact that I want the
courts to lead with liberty does not mean that other bodies must do so as well”).
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By his own admission, Yoshino is much more “confident” and
less “tentative” about the descriptive dimension of his piece than he is
about his strategic or normative recommendations.96 We share his
restrained optimism about the normative “desirability of this shift”
from equality to liberty,97 and articulate our normative reservations at
greater length in Part VI. In fact, it was our normative reservations
with Yoshino’s theory that prompted us to undertake our empirical
inquiry—an inquiry whose results convince us that Yoshino’s lack of
confidence “about the inevitability or desirability of [the] shift” he
advocates is warranted.98
II. DOES JUDICIAL REASONING REALLY RESONATE WITH THE
PEOPLE?
In addition to our significant normative reservations with
Yoshino’s theory, discussed below, we have a straightforward positive
reservation: We doubt that Supreme Court reasoning actually
resonates with the people enough for it to curtail the people’s
pluralism anxiety. Subpart A sets forth the three reasons why we are
skeptical of Yoshino’s normative claim. Subpart B supports our
skepticism with empirical evidence on the relationship between
judicial decisions and the public’s acceptance of them, both in general
and in the particular context of marriage equality.
A. Three Reasons for Skepticism
To recall, Yoshino argues that “the United States Supreme Court
might help create ‘[a] new, broader sense of “we” ’ ”99 by leading with
liberty over equality in decisions vindicating civil rights. We have
doubts about this claim for three interrelated reasons.
First, we are skeptical that the public is sufficiently attuned to the
reasoning of any single Supreme Court opinion to be persuaded by
that reasoning. In other words, Yoshino’s claim conflicts with our
intuitive belief that the general public is unfamiliar with the discrete
aspects of a Supreme Court opinion, including whether or not the

96. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 750 (stating that he is
“confident in [his] descriptive claim that the Court shut doors in its equality jurisprudence
in the name of pluralism anxiety and has opened doors in its liberty jurisprudence to
compensate” but recognizing also that he is “less confident about the inevitability or
desirability of this shift”).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 754 (quoting Putnam, E Pluribus Unum, supra note 56, at 139).
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Court vindicates a right on the basis of liberty or of equality.100 While
Yoshino might be right that some Americans respect and have
confidence in the Supreme Court—36% according to a July 2010
Gallup poll101—it is unlikely that Americans would have more respect
for the Court’s decisions in ideologically salient contexts like abortion
and same-sex marriage because it reasons in one way over another.
We suspect that how the Court reasons is too granular a concern for
most people, even people who are interested in what the Supreme
Court has to say.102 Moreover, even if some attributes of a Supreme
Court decision have been experimentally found to influence the
public’s acceptance of that decision, those attributes—whether the
decision came from a divided Court and whether the decision follows
or overrules precedent103—are highly visible to the public.104 Whether
the Court vindicates the abortion or same-sex marriage right on the
basis of privacy or of equality is not.
Second, even if members of the public were sufficiently attuned
to the reasoning of a Supreme Court opinion, we are skeptical that
they could tell the difference between liberty-based reasoning and
equality-based reasoning, given the close interrelationship between
liberty and equality. Laurence Tribe has described liberty and
equality as two strands in a single “double helix,” a hybrid right which
he conceptualizes as “dignity.”105 Several Supreme Court opinions—
including, notably, Lawrence v. Texas—recognize the deep
interconnectedness between constitutional equality and liberty

100. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 774 (arguing with
respect to the Lawrence opinion specifically that “[i]t would have been hard to focus on
discrete elements of the opinion by the Court and tune out the pre-decision and postdecision framing of the case”).
101. Government, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/27286/Government.aspx (last
visited Sept. 7, 2014); see Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 754 n.55.
102. Indeed, after canvassing the social science literature on the relationship between
Supreme Court decisions and the American public, political scientist Gerald Rosenberg
confidently asserts: “I could devote a considerable number of pages to reviewing the
literature that uniformly finds most Americans do not have a clue as to what the Court is
doing or has done.” Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 566.
103. See, e.g., Zink et al., supra note 7, at 923 (finding that the public is generally more
receptive of Supreme Court decisions with larger majorities and that follow precedent).
104. See id. at 911 (stating that the two opinion attributes that the authors test “are
among the most visible features of Court opinions both in Court decisions themselves and
in the reporting of these decisions in the popular press and therefore among the most
visible to the public”).
105. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004).
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guarantees.106 Even Yoshino admits that these two guarantees are
deeply interwoven.107 We suspect that these guarantees are so closely
connected that it is difficult to determine when the Court is “doing”
civil rights primarily on a liberty basis or primarily on an equality
basis. For reasons explained in greater detail below, our study does
not rule out the possibility that equality and liberty have become so
intertwined that it is unlikely that one will ultimately have more
purchase than the other in the court of public opinion. Because we
tested the public’s receptivity to liberty reasoning and to equality
reasoning separately, it remains uncertain how the public would
receive a decision that incorporates both rationales nearly
simultaneously.108
Third and most relevant to our study, even if the public were
attuned to Supreme Court reasoning and could differentiate between
liberty and equality rationales in a single decision, we are skeptical
that judicial reasoning would ultimately sway or persuade the people
in the way that Yoshino envisions. Other than briefly citing two
scholars who have suggested that casting group-based civil rights in
more universal (and less identity-based) ways might yield positive
results for those groups,109 Yoshino provides no empirical support for
the proposition that Supreme Court reasoning can influence the
public’s general response to Court decisions in high-salience contexts.
106. As Yoshino observes, Lawrence recognized the “hybrid structure” of equality and
liberty when it asserted: “Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.” Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); Yoshino, Tribe, supra note 12, at 967. It is also worth
mentioning that the fundamental right to marry has always, nearly since its inception, been
considered alongside equality, or at least “equal access,” concerns. See, e.g., Martha
Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 688 (2010); Nelson Tebbe &
Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 PENN. L. REV. 1375, 1413
(2010).
107. Yoshino, Tribe, supra note 12, at 970 (“We should . . . recognize that liberty and
equality are intertwined values.”).
108. The majority opinion in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), which
struck down section 3 of DOMA as a violation of the Fifth Amendment and which we
discuss at relative length in Part VI, might be one of these opinions. See Douglas NeJaime,
Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219, 220 (2013), available at
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1205_3mchpr78.pdf (arguing that while the Windsor
majority technically struck down section 3 on equal protection grounds, it is “conceptually,
if not doctrinally, a right-to-marry case”).
109. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 795 (citing Theda
Skocpol, Targeting Within Universalism: Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in
the United States, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 411, 414 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E.
Peterson eds., 1991), and Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From
Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741 (2006)).
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This is not surprising, given that there is a dearth of research on the
link between reasoning and public reactions, something our study
attempts to address.110
B.

Evidence Supporting Our Skepticism

1. Empirical Scholarship on the Public’s Reception of Supreme Court
Decisions
Recent empirical evidence on the relationship between Supreme
Court decisions and the public’s reception of those decisions supports
our skepticism of Yoshino’s claim that the Supreme Court can quell
the public’s pluralism anxiety through the reasoning that it uses in
high-salience contexts like same-sex marriage. For instance, empirical
evidence on the link between decision attributes and public opinion111
suggests that individuals’ ideological predispositions with respect to
issues that the Court decides are the most significant predictor of how
those individuals react to a Court decision.112 This is particularly the
case for high-salience issues, like abortion, where the prior views of
citizens will likely dominate the nuance of a Court’s decision in
shaping public response.113
Scholars empirically testing the relationship between decision
attributes and public opinion have found an inverse relationship
between visible decisional attributes, like majority size, and the
ideological salience of the issue considered in a decision.114 As the
110. While there is a rich discourse on the relationship between Court decisions and
the American public, see, e.g., Klarman Lecture, supra note 29 (discussing the disruptive
backlash that resulted from judicial decisions in high-salience contexts like desegregation
and marriage equality), there is little empirical data on the relationship between Court
reasoning and the American public.
111. Although several commentators have theorized that a connection between
decisional attributes and public acceptance of a decision exists, very few have subjected
that theory to empirical analysis. See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 910 (stating that prior to
the authors’ 2008 study there was “no convincing empirical evidence for the claim that the
attributes of Court decisions have any influence on individuals’ perceptions of those
decisions”).
112. See id. at 923 (observing that there is little empirical evidence that any particular
attribute of a Court decision alters the public’s reaction to it); Patrick Egan & Jack Citrin,
The Limits of Judicial Persuasion and the Fragility of Judicial Legitimacy 7 (July 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4819/egan
citrin.pdf.
113. Some scholars have found that the Court is more likely to affect opinion in regard
to less controversial issues. See, e.g., VALERIE J. HOEKSTRA, PUBLIC REACTION TO
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 9 (2003).
114. See Michael F. Salamone, Judicial Consensus and Public Opinion: Conditional
Response to Supreme Court Majority Size, 67 POL. RES. Q. 320, 320–21 (2014); Zink et al.,
supra note 7, at 910; Egan & Citrin, supra note 112, at 17–19.
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authors of a recent study observe, “[T]he effects of [certain] decision
attributes grow stronger as the ideological salience of the legal issue
declined, so that we see the least consistent effects for the highsalience issue of abortion and the most consistent effects for the lowsalience issue of bankruptcy.”115
Others have similarly found that “it is only in ‘cases with low
salience’ that large majorities have an effect on public attitudes.”116 In
an unpublished article cited this August by The New York Times,117
Cass Sunstein summarizes recent empirical evidence suggesting that
unanimous decisions in culturally contested settings like same-sex
marriage do not guarantee increased public acceptance of them,118
despite some justices’ professed belief that judicial consensus
promotes stability and enhances the Court’s legitimacy in the court of
public opinion.119 Sunstein discusses the empirical work of political
scientist Michael Salamone,120 who has found that “reaction to judicial
consensus is dependent on the ideological salience of the issue
involved”121 and that “the public is unmoved by the majority size in
highly salient decisions.”122
If visible decisional attributes (e.g., majority size, adherence to
precedent) matter less for decisions dealing with high-salience issues
like abortion, then we suspect that less prominent decisional
attributes like judicial reasoning will matter significantly less for
decisions dealing with those issues. The decisional attributes tested in
the literature are not just more visible than judicial reasoning, they
are also more comprehensible. An opinion is likely to be described in
the media as “unanimous” or “divided,” or as “overruling” a wellknown prior case or leaving that case the settled law; the public also
likely has a firm understanding of what those descriptions mean. If
highly visible and easily understood characteristics do not affect

115. Zink et al., supra note 7, at 919.
116. Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court 33,
(Working Paper 2014) (quoting Salamone, supra note 114, at 321), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2466057.
117. Adam Liptak, On Supreme Court, Does 9-0 Add Up to More Than 5-4?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2014, at A13 (citing Sunstein, supra note 116, at 33, and Salamone, supra
note 114).
118. See Sunstein, supra note 116, at 32–34 (summarizing this empirical evidence).
119. See Liptak, supra note 117, at A13 (discussing Justice Ginsburg’s recent
endorsement of the position that “closely divided rulings may be perceived to be less
legitimate than united ones”).
120. See Sunstein, supra note 116, at 32–33.
121. Salamone, supra note 114, at 320.
122. Id.
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public reaction in high-salience cases, it is hard to imagine how more
submerged and complex characteristics could.
Other recent empirical scholarship supports our skepticism that
the Supreme Court can contain backlash through the reasoning that it
employs.123 As mentioned earlier,124 David Fontana and Donald
Braman have subjected the judicial backlash theory—the claim that
the Supreme Court causes a distinctive backlash in the court of public
opinion125—to empirical analysis, and with interesting results.126
Fontana and Braman experimentally examined the following
question: “Does it matter to members of the public whether it is the
Supreme Court or Congress deciding important constitutional issues
of the day?”127 Conventional wisdom suggests that the public reacts
more strongly when the Court decides certain issues than when
Congress decides those issues—that is, that judicial resolution of an
issue (and, in particular, of an ideologically divisive issue) causes a
distinctive public backlash that legislative resolution of that issue
ostensibly avoids.
Contrary to that wisdom, Fontana and Braman found that people
generally do not care whether Congress or the Court decides
important constitutional law issues.128 If people disagree with samesex marriage, then they will react quite negatively to either the Court
or Congress as an institution were either to extend marriage to samesex couples. If people agree with same-sex marriage, then they will
react quite positively to either the Court or Congress as an institution
were either to extend marriage to same-sex couples.129 In other words,
Fontana and Braman found that there is no distinctive public reaction
when the Supreme Court decides constitutional issues, leading them
to theorize that backlash against Congress can be just as strong as

123. We should mention that scholars have also contested the thesis that the Supreme
Court caused a distinctive backlash in the court of public opinion in discrete cases by
looking to history rather than to empirical analysis. Most notable here are Reva Siegel and
Robert Post, who have used history to seriously undermine the Roe v. Wade backlash
thesis, that is, the claim that Roe caused a social and political backlash, one that not only
seriously undermined the public’s respect for courts but has also placed Roe and the
abortion right that it upheld in perpetual peril. Post & Siegel, supra note 79, at 377
(observing that for Roe’s progressive critics, “Roe illustrates the terrible consequences of
judicial decisionmaking that provokes intense opposition”); see also id. at 406–07 nn.180–
82 (summarizing those critics’ arguments).
124. See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
125. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 768.
126. Id. at 735.
127. Id. at 734.
128. See id. at 766–67.
129. See id. at 759.
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backlash against the Court.130 People’s institutional preferences do
not exist in a vacuum, Fontana and Braman found.131 Rather, those
preferences are determined by whether those institutions resolve
constitutional issues in a way that vindicates people’s cultural
worldviews or “cultural priors.”132 This central holding from Fontana
and Braman’s study has been reinforced by other empirical
research.133
We hypothesize that if the Supreme Court does not cause a
distinctive backlash in the court of public opinion because of
institutional features intrinsic to the Court, then it is highly unlikely
that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in ideologically charged cases will
contain public backlash. Fontana and Braman’s study suggests that
cultural worldviews with respect to the issues that the Court decides
drive people’s views of the Court more than anything else. If that is
right, then it is unlikely that the Court can do much to change those
worldviews through its reasoning.134 As Fontana and Braman
themselves assert, “[I]n high-salience cases there is little chance the
Court can convince opponents.”135 If people disagree with same-sex
marriage, then it is unlikely that they will be more supportive if the
Court rests a marriage-equality decision on liberty grounds rather
than on equality grounds. In short, if the people do not care about
who decides a constitutional issue, then why would they care about
how a constitutional issue is decided?

130. Fontana and Braman did find some slight differences with respect to voter turnout
following a decision by the Court versus one by Congress: “Regardless of whether the
Court reached a conservative or liberal outcome, when the Court issued a major decision
conservatives were slightly more likely to vote and liberals were slightly less likely to vote
than if Congress had acted. However, these differences in turnout were not major.”
Braman & Fontana, Supreme Anxiety, supra note 36.
131. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 765–66 (discussing
“contingent institutional preferences”).
132. Id. at 771. Fontana and Braman define “cultural priors” as “prior worldviews
(‘priors’) that might be motivating one’s institutional preferences.” Id. at 734–35.
133. See Benjamin G. Bishin et al., Testing Backlash: The Influence of Political
Institutions on Public Attitudes Toward Gay Rights 23–24 (May 5, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2279675.
134. Furthermore, even if one posits that Supreme Court Justices act rationally to try
to promote their own policy preferences (and, in so doing, may try to constrain backlash
against their policy views), see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES
MAKE 11 (1998), Justices face considerable complexity in acting strategically. They must
balance the degree to which a particular decision promotes their policy goals as well as its
effects on institutional legitimacy and the likelihood that it will trigger a reaction by
Congress. See id. at 11–14.
135. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 782.
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An unpublished paper by political scientists Patrick Egan and
Jack Citrin provides support for our hypothesis.136 Egan and Citrin
conducted a two-wave experiment to evaluate whether the reasoning
used by the Supreme Court affects the public’s attitude towards the
decisions themselves and the public’s belief in the legitimacy of the
Court.137 Egan and Citrin began by assessing respondent attitudes
toward abortion, flag burning, the decriminalization of same-sex
relations, limits on campaign finance, assignment of public school
students by race, and handgun ownership bans.138 One half of
respondents were provided with a one-sentence description of the
reasoning used in a case and the other half were provided with no
such description.139
In five of the six issues studied, Egan and Citrin found that
learning of the Court’s reasoning had no effect on the public’s attitude
toward the decision.140 Learning the Court’s reasoning had “relatively
paltry effects,”141 they write. The authors conclude that the Court’s
“power to shift mass opinions towards accepting its rulings was
essentially nil.”142 The sole exception was Lawrence v. Texas, where
the Court decriminalized same-sex sex.143 Learning that the decision
was based on the right to privacy moved opinion towards the Court’s
decision.144 The authors dismiss that result, however, as inconsistent
with the actual reaction observed in the public; in the aftermath of
Lawrence, they note, support for criminalization of same-sex relations
actually increased (albeit somewhat temporarily).145 Egan and Citrin’s
finding that the Court’s reasoning has no effect on public opinion

136. See generally Egan & Citrin, supra note 112 (finding that the “persuasive powers”
of the Supreme Court are limited).
137. Id. at 10–11.
138. Id. at 10.
139. Id. at 11.
140. See id. at 14.
141. Id. at 22.
142. See id. at 15.
143. Id. at 23.
144. Id. at 15.
145. Id. at 2, 15–16; see also Nathaniel Persily, Patrick Egan & Kevin Wallsten, Gay
Marriage, Public Opinion and the Courts 17 (Apr. 29, 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available
at
http:///www.law.upenn.edu/fac/npersily/gaymarriagessrn.pdf
(“Before
Lawrence only 36 percent [of people surveyed] thought homosexual relations should be
illegal; afterwards, that figure rose to 41 percent.”). Based on public polling, Persily and
his colleagues show that the upsurge in hostility against same-sex sexual relations that
occurred immediately after Lawrence was decided in 2003 eventually subsided in 2005. See
id. at 1 (stating that the post-Lawrence backlash “appears to have leveled off and even
returned to pre-Lawrence levels by the summer of 2005”).
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appears to undercut Yoshino’s argument that the mode of reasoning
employed by the Court can constrain backlash.
2. Empirical Evidence on the Relationship Between Court Decisions
and Public Support for Marriage Equality
If Yoshino were correct in his prediction that equality incites (or
fails to contain) pluralism anxiety, then what would we make of the
fact that we have witnessed increased public support for gay rights
over the past four years despite a consistent trend of courts deciding
gay rights cases not just on an equality basis but also on the
assumption that gays deserve special judicial scrutiny as a class under
equality provisions in state constitutions? Arguably, this trend started
with a few state marriage-equality cases where state supreme courts—
Connecticut, Iowa—decided a same-sex marriage case on equality
grounds, finding that gays and lesbians constituted a quasi-suspect
(rather than a non-suspect) class for the purpose of state
constitutional equality guarantees.146
Several federal district and appeals courts have since followed
their lead, deciding to apply not rational basis review to laws that
discriminate against gays and lesbians but rather heightened judicial
scrutiny—also on the basis that gays as a class deserve that level of
review.147 Importantly, since this trend started in 2009, public support
for gay rights legislation in myriad domains—employment, marriage,
the military—has only increased, and in some cases dramatically so.148

146. See generally Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008)
(applying heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (applying heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation
classifications). Alternatively, one could assert that the rise in public support emanated
from the liberty rationale espoused in Lawrence, but that would require some explanation
for the evident lag between that decision and rising support for gay rights.
147. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying
heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013);
Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326 (D. Conn. 2012) (applying
heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers.
Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 985–90 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (applying heightened scrutiny to
sexual orientation classifications).
148. With respect to employment, a recent poll by the Human Rights Campaign
(“HRC”) found that 73% of 2012 likely voters supported a federal law banning sexual
orientation discrimination in employment; 60% of self-identified conservative voters
supported such a ban. See Americans Overwhelmingly Support Executive Action to Ban
Anti-LGBT Workplace Discrimination, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/
resources/entry/americans-overwhelmingly-support-executive-action-to-ban-anti-lgbtworkplac (last visited Sept. 14, 2014). With respect to marriage, in 2009, 40% of
Americans supported same-sex marriage. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority of Americans
Continue to Oppose Gay Marriage, GALLUP (May 27, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/
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This is all just to say that if Yoshino’s prediction were correct, then
we would at least expect to see decreased support for gay rights
following decisions grounded in equality. If anything, the data suggest
just the opposite.
Maybe the answer is that the public’s growing support for gay
rights simply has nothing to do with judicial decisions; rather, that
support results from changing demographics, greater exposure to gays
and lesbians in popular culture, or advocacy efforts. But if that is the
case, and the judicial decisions embracing gay rights on equality
grounds have been simply irrelevant, that would seem to undermine
Yoshino’s worry that decisions expanding rights on the basis of
equality would reduce the public’s receptiveness to them.
Given what we believe is a strong normative downside to
Yoshino’s tactical advice—one considered at length in Part VI—we
wanted to empirically test the positive foundation of his theory.
Evidence of a robust link between Supreme Court reasoning and
public opinion might outweigh the normative reservation we identify
(for some of Yoshino’s audience, though not for us). However,
evidence of a weak connection between the two variables that
Yoshino assumes to be linked—Supreme Court reasoning and public
opinion—would be even greater reason to approach his tactical
advice with restraint. It is to that empirical inquiry that we now turn.
III. METHODOLOGY
To test the relationship between the expressed rationale for
rights-expanding Supreme Court decisions and the public’s reaction
to those decisions, we employed a methodology adapted from several
previous studies. We used the experimental vignette approach of
Professor Zink and his colleagues.149 In addition, we used the survey
poll/118378/Majority-Americans-Continue-Oppose-Gay-Marriage.aspx. As of July 2013,
that number jumped twelve points. See Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize
Gay Marriage in 50 States, GALLUP (July 29, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163730/
back-law-legalize-gay-marriage-states.aspx. With respect to the military, 75% of
Americans supported the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” before its demise in 2011. See
Brian J. McCabe, Public Opinion on ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2010),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/public-opinion-on-dont-ask-dont-tell/?
_r=0. Professor Katie Eyer also summarizes some of these developments. See Katie R.
Eyer, Marriage This Term: On Liberty and the “New Equal Protection,” 60 UCLA L. REV.
DISC. 2, 9 (2012). She argues that “these developments suggest a major transformation in
the minds of a majority of Americans regarding the social meaning of LGB status.” Id.
149. See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913. Professor Zink and his co-authors explore
whether survey respondents, controlling for ideology, responded to decisional attributes
such as the size of a Supreme Court’s majority coalition and whether the decision follows
or overrules precedent. Id. The study exposed respondents to a brief newspaper article
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sampling approach of Fontana and Braman, attempting to “replicate
actual and potential real-world constitutional conflicts.”150 The
experimental nature of our study is designed to “isolate the impact of
the Court relative to other possible sources of influence” by
minimizing the “noise of the outside world.”151
We retained a private survey firm, Survey Sampling
International, Inc. (“SSI”), to conduct the study.152 SSI maintains a
standing panel reportedly numbering in the millions from which
survey respondents can be drawn.153 The panel for our study was
based on a Census-representative random selection of SSI panelists.
That is, SSI attempted to match our sample’s demographic
characteristics to those of the broader population. We requested a
sample consisting of 1500 subjects. We divided this pool into three
groups, each of which was exposed to a vignette describing a Supreme
Court decision.
Table 1 displays selected demographic data for our overall
sample and each of the three treatment groups. Our panel had a
median level of education of “completed some college” but not
“college degree.”154 Forty-nine percent of our panel was female.155
The mean age for our sample was forty-two.156 The median annual
household income was between $30,000 and $39,000.157

describing a fictional Supreme Court decision with the characteristics in question and then
measured respondents’ agreement with and willingness to accept a decision. See id.
150. See Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 754.
151. HOEKSTRA, supra note 113, at 25. Hoekstra uses panel data to evaluate whether
Court decisions affect public support for the court. Id. at 3–4, 26–28.
152. SURVEY SAMPLING INT’L, INC., http://www.surveysampling.com (last visited Sept.
10, 2014).
153. See N.J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense: No
Impact, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 366–67 (2011).
154. This was also the median level of education for Fontana & Braman. See Fontana
& Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 751.
155. Our sample had a slightly higher level of male participation than the Fontana &
Braman study. See id. at 751.
156. This is several years younger than the Fontana & Braman study. See id.
157. This is one step lower than the level of income in the Fontana & Braman study.
See id.
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Internet,160 and to consider enrolling as members of SSI’s standing
panel.
Respondents were surveyed using SSI’s Dynamic platform.161 By
participating in the survey, they received points which could (when
accumulated with points earned for participation in other surveys)
lead to the reward of a gift card. No other reward was provided to
panelists for participation. Panelists were asked to verify their consent
to the study and were told that they could exit the survey at any time
if they were uncomfortable continuing.162
We limited the focus of our study to subjects’ reactions to
vignettes relating to same-sex marriage. The survey was administered
in the second week of May 2013. This was approximately two months
after the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the DOMA163 and
“Proposition 8” cases164 and was timed to precede the publication of
the Court’s decisions in those cases. Our goal was to administer the
survey at a point in which it might be plausible to a member of the
public that the Court had reached (and was prepared to release the
results of) its decision but before any media coverage concerning an
actual, real-world release of the Court’s opinions.
We exposed panelists to one of three vignettes (dividing our total
survey sample into three separate groups). Each vignette was written
in the style of a newspaper story reporting on a Supreme Court
decision legalizing same-sex marriage. The vignettes were presented
in a font resembling newspaper formatting.165
The first vignette provided information suggesting that the
Court’s decision had been based upon equality concerns. The second
provided information suggesting that the Court’s decision had been
based upon liberty concerns. The third vignette was meant to provide
a “neutral” stimulus—reporting a same-sex marriage endorsement
from the Supreme Court without providing a description of the
reasoning behind the Court’s decision.
The headlines of the “Liberty” and “Equality” vignettes
explicitly referenced the rationale for the Supreme Court’s reported

160. Updated: Change in Internet Access by Age Group, 2000–2010, PEW INTERNET &
AM. LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 10, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Infographics/
2010/Internet-acess-by-age-group-over-time-Update.aspx.
161. One can join SSI’s panel by visiting the site https://www.opinionworld.com/. A
person without internet access, obviously, would not be able to do so.
162. None chose to do so.
163. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
164. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
165. See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913.
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decision. In addition, all three vignettes included a block or pull
quote, located in a separate box, which reported to excerpt the
Supreme Court’s decision.
Prior to reading the vignette, we asked respondents to answer
three sets of questions. The first set of questions, adapted and
updated from the survey used by Fontana and Braman, involved
knowledge of current political events and individuals. The second set
of questions asked respondents about their views on same-sex
marriage.166 The third set of questions asked respondents how
important the issue of same-sex marriage was to them personally and
how closely they followed the issue. After completing these
preliminary questions, respondents were presented with one of the
three vignettes. The survey vignettes appear in Appendix One.
After reading the vignettes, we asked panelists to answer two
sets of questions. The first set of post-stimulus questions asked them
to provide information about the story that they had read, and the
second set of post-stimulus questions asked them to provide their
reaction to the stories. We included the first set of questions in an
attempt to assess panelist comprehension of the stimulus they had
been provided. One possible concern in survey research is that any
statistical results obtained might reflect panelists being confused or
not understanding what they had just read. By asking them to answer
questions about the vignette, we aimed to be able to analyze whether
the effects of each stimulus differed depending on reader
comprehension.
In this comprehension module, we asked five True/False
questions. The first two questions dealt with the Court’s ruling, and
the second two dealt with its reasoning. In the first two questions, we
asked if the Court’s decision requires governments to allow same-sex
marriage or leaves the question to the states. In the third and fourth
questions, we asked if the reason for the Court’s decision was
equality-based or liberty-based. In the fifth question, we asked
whether the Court had provided any reason for its decision.167
The second set of post-stimulus questions represents our primary
dependent variables. We asked panelists, following Zink and his
166. Although Fontana & Braman included questions asking respondents to provide
their views on what the Constitution says about same-sex marriage, Fontana & Braman,
Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 795, we omitted those questions to avoid mixing
questions involving panelist opinions about same-sex marriage and questions about
panelist views on the meaning of the Constitution.
167. An entirely “correct” set of answers for a panelist receiving the equality stimulus
would be true/false/true/false/false.
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colleagues, to provide us with an opinion, first, on whether they agree
with the Court’s decision and, second, on whether they accept the
Court’s decision.168 We included a third question on the panelists’
support for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution which would
prohibit same-sex marriage.
In both our prestimulus questions on panelist attitudes towards
same-sex marriage and our post-stimulus questions seeking reaction
to the reported Court decision, we use a four-point Likert response
scale: strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree.169 While
Zink and his colleagues use a five-point response scale for their
“agreement” dependent variables and a four-point response scale for
“acceptance,”170 we utilize the four-point scale throughout. We
declined to use the neutral response for two reasons: (1) The neutral
response, if coded as “3” on a five-point scale, has the “effect of
pulling the item means to the middle of the scale” and “causes items
on a survey to look more similar”;171 and (2) not including the neutral
response forces respondents to make a choice, even if it involves
expressing a weak opinion.
Other questions involved true/false responses, or, in the case of
the political awareness module, choices reflecting the specific items.
We included a free-form space for panelists to explain why they
reacted to the Court decision in the way they did to facilitate
subsequent qualitative analysis. After providing their free-form
response, panelists were informed that the vignettes they had just
read were fictional in nature (though drawn from issues currently
being litigated in the courts). Finally, we included in matrix form ten
other questions on various issues.
We subjected the results of our study to an ordered logit
regression, utilizing the various reaction questions as dependent
variables and utilizing the prestimulus attitude questions and the
selected stimulus as our primary independent variables. The ordered
logit model is appropriate where ordinal responses are analyzed, but
there is no reason to suppose that the distance between two responses
168. Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913.
169. Fontana & Braman use a six-point scale in the “Policy Preference Module,” which
includes “slight agree” and “moderately agree,” see Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash,
supra note 36, at 796, a four-factor scale in their “Salience Module,” id. at 795, and a sixpoint measure for their “Institutional Preference” dependent variable module, see id. at
796. To facilitate consistency, we employ the four-response scale throughout.
170. Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913.
171. What Is the Right Scale for Agree-Disagree Items on a Survey?, MANAGING WITH
MEASURES BLOG (Feb. 28, 2011, 4:01 PM), http://www.managingwithmeasures.com/whatis-the-right-scale-for-agree-disagree-items-on-a-survey/.

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 303 (2015)

2015]

PUBLIC VIEWS OF JUDICIAL REASONING

337

remains constant along a scale.172 In other words, if one cannot say for
certain that the difference in preference between “strongly disagree”
and “disagree” is the equivalent of the difference between “strongly
agree” and “agree,” then an ordered logit approach is proper.
We created dummy variables for each stimulus, coded as “1” if
the person was presented with a particular stimulus (LIBERTY,
EQUALITY, or the NEUTRAL option). Since the independent
prestimulus attitude variables were also ordinal in nature, we
followed the accepted practice of creating dummy variables for each
response option, coded as “1” if the respondent selected that option
and 0 otherwise. Our regression models omit the “disagree” dummy
variable, which serves as a reference for interpretation of the
“strongly disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree” coefficients.
The regression model for the first cut, where the dependent
variable, Y, would reflect agreement with the Court’s decision,
willingness to accept the Court’s decision, or support for a
constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage, would be:
Y

=

α + β1EQUALITY STIMULUS
+ β2LIBERTY STIMULUS
+ [βmSSM POLICY PREFERENCE
DUMMY VARIABLES]
+ [βnSSM SALIENCE DUMMY
VARIABLES]
+ AGE

In this model, by omitting the dummy variable for the
NEUTRAL stimulus, the coefficients on the LIBERTY and
EQUALITY stimulus dummies become measures of the impact of
reading each of those stories, with the NEUTRAL stimulus serving as
referent. That is, the coefficient we obtain on the LIBERTY
STIMULUS dummy would tell us, by comparison to those receiving
the NEUTRAL STIMULUS, what impact the LIBERTY
STIMULUS had on agreement, acceptance, and support for a
constitutional amendment to undo the supposed Supreme Court
decision. By including both the LIBERTY STIMULUS and

172. Robert K. Fleck & F. Andrew Hanssen, When Voice Fails: Potential Exit As a
Constraint on Government Quality, 35 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 32 n.42 (2013).
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EQUALITY STIMULUS dummy variables in our regression
specification we measure the effect of each stimulus, in comparison to
the other, and by reference to the NEUTRAL STIMULUS.
The null hypothesis, H0, would be
β1 = β2 = 0.
That is, the null hypothesis would be that it should not matter in
determining reactions which stimulus was presented to a subject;
instead, a person’s reaction should be entirely determined by her
prior views about the issue.
IV. RESULTS
A. Initial Results
The first model specification uses the question of agreement as
the dependent variable:
Overall, I agree with the Supreme Court’s decision in this case.173
Subjects responded along a four-point Likert scale (strongly
disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree). Numerically, these were
coded with the numbers 1–4, so a higher number would reflect a more
positive level of “agreement.”
Table 2 reveals that there was no statistically significant
difference among the three subject groups in regard to agreement
with the Court’s decision based on which article they read. The
coefficients on both the LIBERTY and the EQUALITY variables
did not differ from zero at the .05-level of significance. Instead, the
respondents’ level of agreement with the Court’s decision was largely
shaped by their prior views. With a pseudo-R-squared value of .27, a
fairly high level of the variation in respondents’ answers to the
“agreement” question was explained by their prior views and age.174

173. This represents a slight rephrasing of a dependent variable used in the Zink study.
See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913.
174. A pseudo-R-squared of between .2 and .4 is considered “highly satisfactory.”
Andrew Ainsworth, Logistic Regression, Presentation at California State University at
Northridge, available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=
web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCwQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.csun.edu%2F~ata
20315%2Fpsy524%2Fdocs%2FPsy524%2520lecture%252019%2520logistic_cont.ppt&ei=
r7vFUuK9N4mMyQG-w4HYDg&usg=AFQjCNEYCv3Basg6ywl0R9CBv7MRhIEMiA&
sig2=gkBMwAo72Gs-JF1rwrNlfQ&bvm=bv.58187178,d.aWc.
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We obtain statistically significant and predictable results in
regard to the three “prior view” questions included in this
regression.175 The questions asking respondents to indicate how
closely they follow the issue of same-sex marriage and how important

175. First, subjects were asked to give their level of agreement (again, using a fourpoint scale) to the following statement: Permitting gays and lesbians to marry will allow
more Americans to enter into and benefit from loving and committed relationships. This
variable was used in the Fontana & Braman study. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash,
supra note 36, at 70. A subject with a pro-same-sex marriage view would answer “agree”
or “strongly agree,” while a subject with an anti-same-sex marriage view would answer
“strongly disagree” or “disagree.” One would expect the sign on the coefficient on
“disagree” dummies to be negative (disagreeing that same-sex marriage is beneficial
would likely be correlated with a more negative reaction to the Court’s decision), and the
coefficient on “agree” dummies to be positive.
As Table 2 reveals, the coefficients on all three dummy variables for the “loving
and committed relationships” statement included in this specification were statistically
significant at the .05-level (the “disagree” response becomes the reference point through
exclusion from the specification).
The second prior-view question asked respondents to give their level of
agreement (again, using a four-point scale) to the following statement: Allowing gays and
lesbians to marry will undermine traditional marriage and American families. Again, this
variable is derived from the Fontana & Braman study. Fontana & Braman, Judicial
Backlash, supra note 36, at 70.
A pro-same-sex marriage respondent would be expected to disagree with this
statement, while an anti-same-sex marriage respondent would be expected to agree with
this statement. Here, we obtain statistical significance on the two “agree” dummy
variables and the sign is, as one would expect, negative (agreeing that same-sex marriage
would undermine traditional marriage would be expected to correlate with disagreement
with a Court decision legalizing same-sex marriage).
By contrast, the coefficient on the dummy for a “strongly disagree” response is
not statistically significant. This could be interpreted to mean that it does not matter
whether a respondent “disagrees” or “strongly disagrees” on the “undermine marriage”
statement, since the omitted “disagree” response serves here as the referent.
Our third prior-view question asked for respondents to indicate their level of
agreement with the following statement: Marriage should be defined as the union of one
man and one woman. We omitted this question from our regression models to avoid
multicollinearity. Tests for multicollinearity are available upon request.
Our fourth prior-view question asked respondents to give their level of agreement
(again, using a four-point scale) to the following statement: Gay and lesbian couples
should be allowed to marry in the same manner as heterosexual couples.
Again, since we use “disagree” as the referent, we would expect positive
coefficients on the “agree” and “strongly agree” response dummy variables, and a
negative coefficient on the “strongly disagree” dummy variable. As expected, the signs on
agree and “strongly agree” dummies are positive (and the coefficients increase), and the
sign on “strongly disagree” is negative; the coefficients are also statistically significant at
the .05 level. The more a person agrees that gay couples should be permitted to marry, the
more positive her response is to a Court decision requiring states and the federal
government to allow same-sex marriage.
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it is to them personally did not yield statistically significant
variables.176
Table 2: Agreement with Court’s Decision
VARIABLE

Stimulus
Equality Dummy
Liberty Dummy
SSM Prior View
SSM=loving and committed
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
SSM=undermine traditional
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
SSM should be permitted
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
SSM Salience
Important to me personally
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
Closely follow SSM issue
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
Age
Age
Number of Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R-squared
LR chi2

OLOGIT
Coefficient

P-value

-.02
-.12

.86
.35

-.64*
.51*
1.1*

.00
.00
.00

.13
-.49*
-.92*

.48
.00
.00

-1.2*
.97*
1.9*

.00
.00
.00

-.02
.05
.13

.89
.71
.53

.04
-.01
.14

.82
.93
.50

-.00

.15

1502
-1414
.27
1038

* p < .05; two-tailed test

176. Similarly, in this model we did not find that age had a statistically significant effect
on agreement with the Court’s decision, controlling for the “prior view” variables.
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Our second model specification uses the question of acceptance
as the dependent variable:
I accept the Supreme Court’s decision. That is, I think that the
decision ought to be accepted and considered to be the final word on
the matter. I do not think that there ought to be an effort to challenge
the decision and get it changed.177
Here, as indicated in Table 3, we obtain what at first blush
appear to be the most striking results associated with our study. We
find a statistically significant negative coefficient on the dummy
variable for the EQUALITY STIMULUS. That is, reading the
equality stimulus (unlike the liberty stimulus) with the “neutral”
stimulus as a reference point makes respondents less likely to indicate
acceptance of the Court’s decision.178
Although the coefficient on this variable is statistically
significant, its magnitude arguably is not.179 When we calculate the
“Odds Ratio” for this variable, we get a ratio of .74, suggesting that a
change in whether or not a party read the EQUALITY STIMULUS
has only approximately a one in four chance of changing the reader’s
response in terms of acceptance.180 Nevertheless, the results on
acceptance, while perhaps anomalous, merit further discussion, in
which we engage below.

177. This is a slight rephrasing of a variable described as “the most commonly used
measure in the literature.” See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 913 (citing James L. Gibson,
Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, Why Do People Accept Public Policies
They Oppose? Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES.
Q. 187, 190–91 (2005)).
178. Dropping the subjects viewing the “neutral” stimulus from the pool, we do not
find a statistically significant difference in regard to either acceptance or agreement with
the Court’s decision based on viewing the equality, rather than the liberty stimulus. That
is, while there is a negative effect of EQUALITY on acceptance in the primary
regressions, and no effect of LIBERTY, a comparison of only LIBERTY and
EQUALITY does not produce a statistically significant difference. Full regressions are
available from authors upon request.
179. The -.30 coefficient suggests that, for subjects reading the EQUALITY
STIMULUS, controlling for other variables, they would move less than a third of the way
towards a “lower” level of agreement (that is, less than a third of a way from, say,
“strongly agree” to “agree”). The 95% confidence interval for this coefficient is between .54 and -.06, suggesting that it is possible that the actual effect of reading the EQUALITY
STIMULUS may be even lower.
180. Odds-ratio calculations are available from the authors upon request.
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The coefficient on the LIBERTY STIMULUS, by comparison, is
not statistically significant at the .05 level.181
As reflected in Table 3, we continue to observe statistically
significant coefficients (with predictable signs) on the “prior views”
questions concerning whether to permit same-sex marriage and
whether permitting same-sex marriage would expand the number of
persons in loving and committed relationships.182
Table 3: Accept Court’s Decision
VARIABLE

Stimulus
Equality Dummy
Liberty Dummy
SSM Prior View
SSM=loving and committed
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
SSM=undermine traditional
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
SSM should be permitted
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy

OLOGIT
Coefficient

P-value

-.29*
-.19

.01
.12

-.44*
.39*
.87*

.02
.02
.00

.28
-.12
-.65*

.12
.44
.00

-1.1*
.83*
1.4*

.00
.00
.00

181. Similarly, if we drop the subjects receiving the EQUALITY STIMULUS from our
model and compare only the subjects receiving the LIBERTY STIMULUS to those
receiving the NEUTRAL STIMULUS, we get a positive but not statistically significant
coefficient on the LIBERTY STIMULUS dummy. Full regressions are available from
authors upon request. In other words, compared to the NEUTRAL STIMULUS, the
LIBERTY STIMULUS dummy appears to have no discernible impact on subject
acceptance.
182. Similarly, we continue to find mixed results for the question relating to whether
permitting same-sex marriage would undermine traditional families.
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SSM Salience
Important to me personally
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
Closely follow SSM issue
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy

.21
-.02
.32

.16
.89
.11

-.05
-.08
.48*

.76
.55
.02

Age
Age

-.00

.22

Number of Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R-squared
LR chi2

343

1502
-1575
.19
742

* p < .05; two-tailed test

Our third model specification uses the question of support for a
constitutional amendment as the dependent variable. Respondents
were asked for their level of agreement with the following statement:
I support an amendment to the United States Constitution that
would prohibit same-sex couples from marrying.
The results of the regressions for amendment support are
reported in Table 4. Neither the EQUALITY nor the LIBERTY
treatments had a statistically significant effect on respondents’
support for a constitutional amendment.183

183. Interestingly, in this specification, for the first time, all of the response dummies
for the question relating to whether legalizing same-sex marriage would undermine
traditional marriage were statistically significant. Similarly, for the first time we find
statistically significant effects for those who “strongly agree” that they closely follow the
issue and that it is important to them personally—with strong followers and those feeling
the issue is personally important statistically more likely to support a constitutional
amendment. We also, for the first time, find that age has a statistically significant (though
low magnitude) effect on our dependent variable—the older the person, the lower his
support for a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage (again, though, the
coefficient is quite small).
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Table 4: Support for Constitutional Amendment Banning SSM
VARIABLE

Stimulus
Equality Dummy
Liberty Dummy
SSM Prior View
SSM=loving and committed
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
SSM=undermine traditional
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
SSM should be permitted
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
SSM Salience
Important to me personally
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
Closely follow SSM issue
Strongly Disagree Dummy
Agree Dummy
Strongly Agree Dummy
Age
Age
Number of Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R-squared
LR chi2
* p < .05; two-tailed test

OLOGIT
Coefficient

P-value

-.00
-.11

.96
.39

.48*
-.18
-.43

.02
.29
.07

-1.6*
.85*
1.44*

.00
.00
.00

1.2*
-.49*
-1.71.9*

.00
.00
.00

-.02
.95
.54*

.87
.52
.01

.23
.15
.71*

.18
.26
.00

-.01*

.00

1502
-1443
.29
1208

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 303 (2015)

2015]
B.

PUBLIC VIEWS OF JUDICIAL REASONING

345

Extension: Subject Comprehension

After obtaining the preliminary results discussed above, we next
attempted to determine whether panelists’ comprehension of the
vignettes they encountered affected their reactions to those decisions.
Unfortunately, we found that our respondents, at a very high rate,
answered “True” both when asked if the Court used a liberty
rationale and when asked if the Court used an equality rationale.184
For instance, of our 500 subjects reading the EQUALITY
STIMULUS, 378 answered “True” both when asked whether the
reason for the Court’s decision was equality-based and liberty-based.
For the 500 subjects reading the LIBERTY STIMULUS, 409
answered “True” both when asked if the reason for the Court’s
decision was equality-based and liberty-based. Among respondents
exposed to the NEUTRAL STIMULUS (with no mention of the
Court’s reasoning), 371 answered “True” when asked whether the
Court had used both equality-based and liberty-based rationales.
Given these results, we constructed a new set of variables to
reflect panelist comprehension without requiring an “entirely correct”
response.185 This allows the reapplication of the regression models to
a smaller sample with only those answering “correctly” being
included. With N=322 for that population, we end up with coefficients
on the EQUALITY and LIBERTY STIMULUS dummy variables in
an ordered logit regression that are not statistically significant.186
Instead, then, we constructed a new regression model in which
we exploited the information generated regarding whether panelists

184. In retrospect, it would have been better to present the Comprehension module as
a single question, from which respondents selected a single “right” answer, rather than as
three separate “True/False” questions. It is also possible that our efforts to describe in
understandable yet specific terms whether the reasoning was based on equality or liberty
remained confusing for panelists. While we labored to construct clear questions in this
area, we may not have gotten to the point we had hoped.
185. For those receiving the LIBERTY STIMULUS, we treated their comprehension
response as “correct” if they: (1) correctly responded that the Court’s decision requires
governments to allow same-sex marriage and does not leave the question open to the
states; (2) answered “True” when asked whether the Court used a liberty-based rationale;
and (3) answered “False” to the question of whether the story omitted any discussion of
the Court’s explanation. Similarly, for those receiving the EQUALITY STIMULUS, we
treated as “correct” accurate answers to the two questions relating to the impact of the
Court’s decision, and a “True” response to the question regarding whether the rationale
was equality-based accompanied by a “False” response to the no-rationale question. In
other words, we counted as “correct” a portion of responses that answered “True” to both
our LIBERTY and EQUALITY comprehension question, so long as they did not also
answer “True” to our no-rationale question.
186. The full results from this regression are available from the authors upon request.
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answered correctly but did not excise 75% of our study subjects.187
This model attempts to take into account whether subjects
demonstrated a relatively higher level of understanding and
comprehension of the vignettes with which they were presented. We
created a new dummy variable coded as “1” for a “correct” response
(as described above) and zero otherwise. We then added that dummy
variable to ordered logit regressions. Here, for the specification using
the most interesting of our dependent variables, “acceptance,” we
found that having a “correct” understanding of the vignettes
presented was associated with a more positive level of “acceptance.”
The coefficient on the new “correct” variable is .28, with a p-value of
.022.188
On the other hand, we found a statistically significant negative
coefficient on the EQUALITY STIMULUS, and a negative and
nearly significant coefficient on the LIBERTY STIMULUS dummy
variable.189 In other words, we can say that, by controlling for subject
understanding of the vignettes, both the EQUALITY STIMULUS
and the LIBERTY STIMULUS have negative effects on panelist
acceptance when compared to the NEUTRAL STIMULUS. To be
clear, what these results do not suggest is that those who best
understood our instrument had more negative responses when seeing
one of the two stimuli that contained an explanation of the Court’s
reasoning. This specification tests the effect of the LIBERTY and
EQUALITY STIMULI taking into account the level of panelist
comprehension. In fact, the positive and statistically significant
coefficient on the “correctness” measure, read in light of the negative
coefficients on both reasoning stimulus variables, suggests the
following: (1) understanding was associated with a higher level of
acceptance; and (2) the negative effects of being presented with
“reasoning” explanations may be concentrated among those who
demonstrated a relatively low level of understanding of the reasoning
in the Court’s supposed decision.
To extend this inquiry, we developed an additional regression
model that utilized interaction terms connecting the “correctness”
and “stimulus” variables. The coefficient on the term interacting the
187. Our subjects demonstrated what appears to be a low level of comprehension, or at
least they were unable to evidence that comprehension in their survey responses; yet their
responses did appear to be influenced by the nature of the stimulus they had been
administered.
188. Full regression results are available from the authors upon request.
189. We find statistically significant negative coefficients on both terms in the ordered
logit specification.
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LIBERTY or EQUALITY STIMULUS dummy with the
comprehension dummy would isolate the effect of reading either
stimulus (as opposed to the NEUTRAL STIMULUS) for those with
a high level of comprehension from the effects of reading each
stimulus generally. For the coefficients on both interaction terms, we
get positive signs, just outside of the range of statistical significance at
the .05-level.190 The coefficients on the EQUALITY and LIBERTY
dummies remain negative and statistically significant. This suggests
that for those who understood the vignettes, explanations of either
liberty or equality grounds enhanced acceptance when compared to
the no-explanation rationale. On the other hand, for those with a
lower level of understanding of the vignettes, either rationale
continued to exert a negative effect on acceptance.
C.

Extension: Limiting Analysis to Those with Strong Positive
Reactions to the Court’s Decision

Our study aimed to explore backlash, but our survey only seeks
to obtain information about subjects’ immediate reactions and
responses to the vignettes to which they were exposed. In the real
world, backlash is a more complicated phenomenon. For backlash to
a Supreme Court decision to arise, there would likely need to be some
mobilization of popular objections by elites and other policy
entrepreneurs.191 Our study cannot answer the question of when a
Court decision is likely to trigger backlash in that it does not include
any other mediating influences besides a simulated newspaper report
discussing the Court’s decision.
That said, it is logical to posit that elites can only mobilize a
backlash against a decision where the public does not strongly
support or accept that decision. Therefore, we construct an additional
regression model in which we limit our analysis to those respondents
who “strongly agreed” or “strongly accepted” the Court’s decision.
Here, we posit that such individuals could not be mobilized by elites
to form part of a backlash. To the extent that the Court’s reasoning
affects the proportion of respondents “strongly agreeing” with the
decision or who “strongly agree” that they accept the decision, it
would be far more difficult for elites to mobilize a backlash.
Arguably, even respondents who “agreed” with a decision could,

190. Regression results are available from the authors upon request.
191. Egan & Citrin, supra note 112, at 5 (“[I]n reality a Supreme Court ruling is just the
opening salvo of a debate among the nation’s elites that can quickly overwhelm any of the
persuasive power of the ruling in a case.”).
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under the right circumstances, be convinced by elites that the decision
was objectionable and could thus become part of a backlash.
To construct this next set of regressions, we create dummy
variables coded as “1” if a respondent strongly agrees with the
Court’s decision or strongly agrees with the statement that she
accepts the Court’s decision. Since this limited dependent variable is
not an ordinal one, we use a logit rather than ordered logit approach.
The results confirmed the earlier regression model.192 There is no
statistically significant effect in terms of the level of strong agreement
with the Court’s decision based on which stimulus respondents
viewed, controlling for age, prior views on the issue and salience.193
However, there is a statistically significant negative effect on
acceptance based on viewing the equality-based stimulus. This could
be read to suggest that a Court decision using an equality rationale
will produce a smaller share of the public that strongly accepts the
decision and which would be predisposed in a manner inconsistent
with mobilization for backlash. But with little effect on strong
agreement with the decision, it is hard to conclude that overall an
equality rationale does not do as good a job as a liberty rationale or
no rationale at all in containing backlash by minimizing the pool of
people receptive to mobilization by elites against the Court’s decision.
V. DISCUSSION
Our study tested Yoshino’s theory that Supreme Court reasoning
in decisions vindicating civil rights in high-salience contexts—like
same-sex marriage—can affect the public’s reception of those
decisions. For reasons set forth more fully below, we remain
unconvinced that the Court’s reasoning matters to the people. While
our results do intriguingly suggest that any reasoning might negatively
affect the public’s reception of certain decisions, they do not
overwhelmingly support the proposition that a particular kind of
reasoning will dampen any pluralism anxiety that the public is likely
to exhibit in response to those decisions.
Before our study, our intuition was that reasoning was not as
significant a determinant of public reception of certain decisions as
were other factors, including cultural priors with respect to highsalience issues like same-sex marriage. After our study—with some

192. Full results are available from the authors upon request.
193. The coefficient on the EQUALITY STIMULUS here was negative, with a pvalue of .052, which is just outside of the range of statistical significance.
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important limitations which are discussed here—our intuition remains
the same.
A. Differences Between Liberty and Equality Do Not (Really)
Resonate with the People
Our hypothesis was that judicial reasoning is simply too granular
and nuanced to affect public reaction to judicial decisions in culturally
contested cases such as same-sex marriage. The results of our study
overwhelmingly confirm our preliminary intuition. Whether subjects
agree or disagree with a Court opinion, and whether they support a
constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage, appear to
be determined not by the reasoning employed by the Court but
instead by the subjects’ prior views of the issue.
To be sure, we did find limited evidence that where the Supreme
Court employs equality-based reasoning in legalizing same-sex
marriage, the public’s “acceptance” of the Court’s decision is
reduced.194 These results conflict with those of past experiments
connecting public acceptance and Court decisions. In those
experiments, researchers found little relationship between the basis
for a Court decision and public acquiescence.195 That said, the
magnitude of the effect we observe is relatively small, and thus, even
though we are somewhat intrigued by the results of our study, we are
unable to conclude that, broadly speaking, an equality-based
rationale produces a different response in terms of public support for
an opinion.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 display our results visually, by focusing on
respondents’ prestimulus response to the question of whether gay and
lesbian couples should be permitted to marry in the same fashion as
heterosexual couples (the most robustly predictive of our “prior
views” dependent variables). Dividing survey respondents according
to their level of agreement with that statement (on a four-point scale)
and the stimulus to which they were exposed produces a 4 X 3
between-subjects design. Figure 2 may overstate the effect of
194. It bears mentioning that while we find that equality rationales have a slight
negative effect on acceptance, we do not observe a greater level of support for a
constitutional amendment based on exposure to an equality rationale. The respondents
are simultaneously reporting that they are less likely to accept the Court’s equality-based
decision as the final word on the matter, but are no more likely to want to amend the
Constitution. It may be that the public views constitutional amendments as a particularly
harsh response. Instead of an amendment overturning a Court decision, those less inclined
to accept the decision may prefer that legislation or a subsequent Court decision weaken a
same-sex marriage precedent at the margins.
195. Gibson et al., supra note 177, at 192.
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accept a Supreme Court decision vindicating marriage equality for
same-sex couples.197 Still, the magnitude of the effect appears to be
small, and weighed alongside the lack of any observable difference in
“agreement” with a decision, or support for an amendment to
overturn a decision, we are unwilling to conclude at this point that our
study suggests a clear influence of judicial reasoning on public
reception. Given that reading the equality stimulus had only around a
one in four chance of changing a respondent’s answer on
“acceptance” and no effect on a respondent’s “agreement” or support
for a constitutional amendment overturning the Court’s decision, we
are unable to conclude that judicial reasoning, as a positive matter, is
decisive in shaping public reactions.
Interestingly, while our results do not provide strong support for
the proposition that equality is that much worse than liberty in terms
of losing public acceptance of a Supreme Court opinion vindicating
marriage for same-sex couples, they do provide support for the
proposition that any reasoning tends to be worse than no reasoning at
all. That is, when controlling for subjects’ comprehension, we see a
negative effect of both the liberty rationale and the equality rationale
when compared to the neutral rationale.198 This is intriguing. It could
be that the public does not understand that justifying decisions is
commonplace—and required, of course, by principles of sound
jurisprudence.199 Perhaps the public presumes that a decision that
does not need to be justified is most in line with governing law and
authority. This may be especially pronounced for those subjects that
are confused about the questions/stimuli. When low-comprehension

197. In this sense, our results stand apart from previous work, which has found a
stronger relationship between signals from the Court and public agreement than between
such signals and public acceptance. See Zink et al., supra note 7, at 922. Our study finds
the opposite in the case of Court signals relating to the reasons for decisions––those
articulated reasons have a greater effect in our study on acceptance than on agreement.
See supra tbls. 2–4. Perhaps there is something special about same-sex marriage. Or
perhaps there is something distinguishing our treatment (the Court’s reasoning) from the
treatment employed in prior research (such as whether the decision overrules precedent
and is unanimous).
198. The negative effect of the liberty rationale, while not statistically significant at the
.05-level, was statistically significant at the more generous .10-level.
199. See Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61
ALA. L. REV. 501, 532 (2010) (“Courts must give reasons for their decisions, and their
decisions must reasonably relate to the specific case they are deciding.”). That the public
does not believe that this is so is supported by public opinion research, which has found
that a near majority (47%) of the public either believes that the Court does not regularly
give reasons for its rulings (18%) or does not know (29%). See Michael Serota, Popular
Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1659 (2012).
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subjects—the vast majority of subjects in our study—encounter any
rationale, they may be less likely to accept the decision.200
Alternatively, it could be that the negative effects of equality and
liberty vis-à-vis no rationale in our study was the result of implicit bias
against same-sex marriage, sexual minorities, or both. That is, it could
be that subjects were less likely to accept a Supreme Court decision
that vindicated marriage equality on the basis of a rationale rather
than no rationale because the vignettes presenting a rationale
(whether liberty or equality) contained more reasoning than the
neutral stimulus. More reasoning, in turn, involves more language
about things like “same-sex marriage” and “gays/lesbians”—language
that could conceivably trigger subjects’ implicit bias against same-sex
marriage and/or sexual minorities.
More specifically, hundreds of validated studies have shown that
implicit bias against gay people not only exists, but also influences
biased individuals’ treatment of them.201 Even people who explicitly
support gay rights exhibit implicit bias against gay people.202
Moreover, one of the tests used by social scientists to measure
implicit bias against sexual minorities, the Implicit Association Test,
uses words like “gay” and “lesbian” to trigger unconscious bias.203
It could be, then, that the more the Court in our vignettes
reasoned about same-sex marriage—and, in particular, about the
rights of “gays” and “lesbians” to marriage—the more our subjects’
implicit biases were triggered. The negative effects of both liberty and
equality relative to no rationale—as well as the slightly more negative
effect of equality, whose vignette drew attention to “gays” and
“lesbians”—might therefore be capturing that implicit bias.204 While

200. Future work could explore this possibility by inserting an additional stimulus
involving an implausible line of reasoning (e.g., justifying a same-sex marriage decision by
reference to the bankruptcy code).
201. See Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 88, at 1170.
202. See Yoel Inbar et al., Disgust Sensitivity Predicts Intuitive Disapproval of Gays, 9
EMOTION 435, 438 (2009).
203. For a description of the Implicit Association Test, see Anthony G. Greenwald et
al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test,
74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464–66 (1998) (introducing and describing
the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”)); see also Brian A. Nosek, Anthony G. Greenwald
& Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and
Conceptual Review, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE
AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES 265, 267–71 (John A. Bargh ed., 2007).
204. If that is right—that is, if it is true that our findings on the slightly negative effects
of equality on acceptance are capturing the well-documented phenomenon of implicit bias
against homosexuality—then what Yoshino calls “pluralism anxiety” might actually be the
product of an implicit bias against equality-related concepts.
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subjects may not have understood what they were reading, they
clearly reacted to it; their reactions, perhaps unconscious, were
pronounced.205
In sum, our primary positive reservation with Yoshino’s theory
was not overcome by our results. We remain unconvinced that it
matters to the people (in terms of alleviating or curtailing their
pluralism anxiety) whether the Court rests a marriage-equality
decision on liberty or on equality. Our findings with respect to the
equality rationale were simply not strong enough to suggest to us that
liberty does that much better a job at containing pluralism anxiety—
and perhaps, by extension, backlash—than does equality.
Importantly, we did find that reasoning generally matters in terms of
public reception of a hypothetical marriage-equality decision, as our
subjects exhibited a more negative reaction to vignettes that
contained some reasoning as opposed to no reasoning at all. An
explanation for this finding is hard to pinpoint, although one
possibility is that more reasoning contains more language and that
there is something about language—and particularly the language
used in our vignettes—that triggers an intuitive response against
same-sex marriage generally, and sexual minorities specifically.
B.

Our Study’s Limitations

Our study, like most empirical and experimental work,206 has
some limitations. The first and most obvious limitation of our study is
one that is also reflected in prior work such as that of Professors Zink,
Braman, and Fontana, namely that backlash involves a complex
process that cannot be captured through the administration of a single
survey instrument.207 We accept that our method does not capture the
nuance that shapes, over a period of months or years, how a Court
decision may be received by the public.208 Perhaps it is more
appropriate to say that what we are really capturing—as suggested in
the previous subpart209—is the implicit or unconscious bias that the
205. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
206. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 756.
207. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo,
93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2159–63 (2012) (describing failure of survey data to accurately
capture backlash as a phenomenon).
208. Among the many factors—aside from Supreme Court reasoning—that might
generate backlash are: “public opinion on the underlying issue; the relative intensity of
preference on the two sides of the issue; the degree to which public opinion is divided
along geographic or regional lines; and the ease with which a particular Court ruling can
be circumvented or defied.” Klarman, supra note 5, at 148.
209. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.
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public has against particular terms or concepts that appear in
descriptions of a Court decision.
Second, our model presumes that the content of Court decisions
reaches the members of the public, which may not always happen in
the real world. Our research question was whether the reasoning
articulated by the Supreme Court could serve to alleviate the people’s
pluralism anxiety and, by extension, constrain public backlash. For
the Court’s reasoning to matter in the real world, the following must
occur: (1) The Court articulates reasons; (2) the public learns of the
Court’s articulation; and (3) the public understands the Court’s
articulation. Our survey skips step two in this process, or, to be
precise, assumes that step two occurs. Our findings cannot measure
whether the public would be likely to encounter Court reasoning if
the public does not seek it out; instead, all we can measure is how the
public responds when it is presented with judicial reasoning.
Third, our study isolates the Supreme Court’s role from the role
of other cultural actors that will affect public disposition in the
aftermath of Court decisions in controversial cases. Whatever the
Supreme Court might say could, in the real world, be “drowned out
by the polarizing re-biasing being performed by interested parties in
these cases.”210 Even the best efforts by the Court to constrain
backlash through messaging can thus be undermined.211 Our study, of
course, subjects panelists only to news about a decision and does not
expose them to the full panoply of voices they would likely encounter
in the real world.
Fourth and related, our study is limited in that all subjects
received word of the Court’s decision in a uniform fashion. In the real
world, “citizens learn about different Court decisions based on
information available and salient to them,” which means it may be
“misguided” to assume “uniform national effects.”212
Fifth, we tested equality and liberty rationales in isolation,
whereas Yoshino’s precise argument is not that courts should ignore
equality in favor of liberty, but instead that courts ought to lead with
liberty.213 Further work could present vignettes embracing both
arguments but alter the order of presentation to see if the ordering of
210. Fontana & Braman, Judicial Backlash, supra note 36, at 773.
211. Id.
212. HOEKSTRA, supra note 113, at 3.
213. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 747, 802 (Yoshino notes
that “constitutional equality and liberty claims are often intertwined” as so-called “dignity
claims” but advocates for “liberty-based dignity jurisprudence [because it] leads with
[liberty] to quiet pluralism anxiety in an increasingly diverse society”).
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arguments leads to different reactions. Given low levels of subject
comprehension in our study, we are skeptical that such an approach
would produce observable differences. Subjects in our study
attributed rationales to the Court not included in the vignettes they
read. There is no reason to believe that members of the public would
be discerning enough to grasp differences in the order in which
arguments were presented.
Sixth and last, our study was limited to the issue of same-sex
marriage. Yoshino’s theory is not so limited; instead, he argues that
the “leading with liberty” tactic should be applied in a larger subset of
cases dealing with the vindication of “civil rights.”214 Future work
could adopt our methodology to test the impact of judicial reasoning
on public reactions in a wider variety of scenarios.
VI. NORMATIVE CRITIQUE
As noted in this Article’s introduction, our primary objection to
Yoshino’s theory is a normative one, and it is to this objection that we
now turn. Even if Yoshino is descriptively correct that pluralism
anxiety is alleviated better by liberty than by equality—which we
seriously doubt for all of the reasons set forth above—we would still
reject his suggestion that courts downplay the equality demands of
identity groups in decisions vindicating their civil rights. The results of
our study, which found scant support for the proposition that equality
is significantly worse than liberty in terms of cultivating public
acceptance, simply make a stronger case for why rejecting Yoshino’s
theory makes sense not just from a normative standpoint (as we
argue) but from a positive standpoint as well.
More specifically, we argue that Yoshino’s suggested strategy of
“leading with liberty” in gay rights cases amounts to judicial
“covering” of what is really “at stake” in them.215 Liberty, under this
view, is less antidote and more anodyne. Our critique is limited to an
examination of the “leading with liberty” idea in the context of gay
rights specifically—a context that seems especially important to

214. Id. at 792 (“[W]here a claim can be validly characterized as either a liberty-based
or an equality-based dignity claim, it should be characterized as the former.”); id. at 793–
97 (discussing his “new equal protection” theory in the context of “civil rights” more
generally).
215. See Heather K. Gerken, Larry and Lawrence, 42 TULSA L. REV. 843, 851 (2007)
(“[W]hat is really at stake in these debates [over sexual orientation discrimination] is not
whether all humans should enjoy a right, but whether gays and lesbians, in particular,
should do so, and that idea is better captured by the equal protection paradigm.”).
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Yoshino, given his reliance on gay rights and on key gay rights cases
to articulate his theory.216
Should the Supreme Court establish a national marriage-equality
precedent at some point in the near future—as some scholars have
predicted217—we believe that it ought to resist Yoshino’s suggested
strategy for two reasons relating to the “covering” idea. The first
reason, discussed in Subpart A, concerns the relationship between
liberty rationales and the peculiar rhetorical history that has attended
the law’s treatment of sexual minorities for decades. The second
reason, addressed in Subpart B, concerns the relationship between
liberty rationales and implicit bias against gay people.
A. Liberty and Sexual Minorities’ Peculiar Rhetorical History
To borrow an image with which Yoshino is well familiar, we
believe that leading with liberty in gay rights cases constitutes
undesirable judicial “covering”218 of what those cases are really about:
discrimination against gays and lesbians. Consider, for instance,
Yoshino’s recommendation that courts frame the question of gay
marriage in liberty terms rather than in equality terms in order to
make gay marriage more palatable to the general public.219 He asks

216. Yoshino anticipates four objections to his theory in his Harvard Law Review
article. One is that we ought to encourage people to overcome their anxieties rather than
capitulate to them. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 797. A second is
that “with respect to certain groups, we should be careful about jumping to a higher level
of generality” through, say, liberty-based rationales. Id. at 798. A third is that “libertybased dignity claims allow subordinated groups to contest their subordination only in a
piecemeal fashion.” Id. at 799. A fourth is that the “liberty-based dignity paradigm . . . is a
false rescue because it substitutes one slippery-slope claim for another.” Id. More
specifically, the liberty claim replaces the question of which groups ought to receive
protection with the question of which rights ought to receive protection. Id. at 800.
Yoshino responds to each of these objections in turn. Professor Katie Eyer has recently
articulated a different normative objection to Yoshino’s theory. See Eyer, supra note 148,
at 6. She argues that “there are strong signs that the [LGB] movement has finally ‘arrived,’
rendering it plausible for the first time that the Court may extend full equal protection
coverage.” Id. Professor Eyer further contends that “there are reasons to believe that
Yoshino’s suggested focus [on liberty over equality] might actually be counterproductive
for groups that have reached this equal protection tipping point.” Id.
217. Klarman, supra note 5, at 158 (“Within a few years of Windsor, as public support
for gay marriage continues to increase and as more states enact it into law, one can
imagine some Justices being tempted to extend that ruling to forbid the states from
excluding same-sex couples from marriage. Indeed, the Windsor dissents of both Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia seem mostly addressed to that eventuality . . . .”).
218. YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT, supra note 48, at ix; Yoshino,
Covering, supra note 49, at 794.
219. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 793.
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readers to consider how different the following two claims sound “to
the American ear:
(1) ‘Gays should have the right to marry because straights have
the right to marry and gays are equal to straights;’ or
(2) ‘All adults should have the right to marry the person they
love.’ ”220
Echoing a similar argument made by Martha Nussbaum,221
Yoshino argues that proposition two is more “persuasive” than
proposition one because
it performs the empathy it seeks. It frames the right at a high
enough level of generality that opposite-sex couples are urged
to imagine a world in which they were denied the right. In
contrast, equal protection claims tend to stress distinctions
among us, even as they ask us to overcome those distinctions.222
Under this view, proposition two is more persuasive than proposition
one because it downplays an essentializing equality claim in favor of a
more universalizing liberty claim.
But proposition two downplays something else that might make
it more appealing to the public than proposition one: gay and lesbian
identity. In this particular example, it is not just equality that is elided
from the liberty statement, it is equality for gays and lesbians
specifically that is absent. The “gays” of proposition one are collapsed
into the “all adults” of proposition two. The gay discrimination
objected to in proposition one becomes the people-who-want-tomarry discrimination objected to in proposition two. If “covering,” as
Yoshino elsewhere defines it, means “to tone down a disfavored
identity to fit into the main stream,”223 then this particular liberty
frame exemplifies the covering idea.
Admittedly, there is evidence to support the notion that covering
or toning down the “gay” aspect of the marriage question might make
gay marriage an easier sell to the public. At least one study has shown
that the very words “gay” and “lesbian” can bring implicit bias—the
sort of bias that people are either unwilling or unable to acknowledge,

220. Id.
221. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY 205–06 (2010)
(suggesting that cultivating empathy—the ability to place yourself in another’s shoes—is a
promising way to move past disgust and toward humanity for gays and lesbians).
222. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 794.
223. YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT, supra note 48, at ix.
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or both—against sexual minorities to the surface.224 If that is right,
then framing gay marriage in a way that omits the “gay” might make
people less anxious and more supportive of it. As mentioned earlier,
our study provides some support for this proposition, as we found
that any reasoning—and, to some extent, equality-based reasoning in
particular—makes people less receptive to Supreme Court decisions
vindicating same-sex marriage. Thus understood, framing marriage
for “gays” as marriage for “all adults” might serve the strategic ends
of winning marriage for gays and alleviating pluralism anxiety for all
of us.
However, framing same-sex marriage a certain way simply in
order to appease the public is no less problematic than framing sexual
orientation discrimination as sex discrimination or as conceptualizing
marriage discrimination against gays and lesbians as the
contemporary incarnation of Jim Crow.225 Each of these arguments
substitutes one kind of discrimination (liberty, sex, race) for another
(gay/lesbian). Each has a “transvestic quality”226 that camouflages gay

224. Implicit Association Test, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
(last visited Sept. 3, 2014). The word “homosexual” apparently triggers even more implicit
bias than the more politically correct “gay” and “lesbian.” According to a New York
Times poll conducted before the military’s exclusionary policy was lifted, 42% of
Americans opposed allowing “homosexuals” to serve openly in the military, whereas only
28% opposed allowing “gay men and lesbians” to serve openly. See Geoffrey R. Stone,
Gays and Lesbians or Homosexuals?, HUFF. POST (Apr. 15, 2010, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/gays-and-lesbians-or-homo_b_
461668.html. Indeed, the results of the New York Times poll helps explain why the only
opinion to mention the word “homosexuals” and its variants in the Supreme Court’s most
recent landmark gay rights case, United States v. Windsor, is that of Justice Scalia—in
dissent. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
225. With respect to the sex-discrimination argument, Edward Stein contends that it
“mischaracterizes the core wrong of these laws [that discriminate against gays and
lesbians],” which are motivated, in his view, not by sexism but rather by a particular moral
view of gays and lesbians. Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for
Lesbian and Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 503–04 (2001). “[B]y failing to address
arguments about the morality of same-sex sexual acts and the moral character of lesbians,
gay men, and bisexuals,” he argues, “the sex-discrimination argument ‘closets,’ rather than
confronts, homophobia.” Id. With respect to the race-discrimination argument, one of us
contends that it ignores the centuries-old history of discrimination that such laws
embody—discrimination that is unique to gays and lesbians. See Courtney Megan Cahill,
(Still) Not Fit to Be Named: Moving Beyond Race to Explain Why ‘Separate’ Nomenclature
for Gay and Straight Relationships Will Never Be ‘Equal,’ 97 GEO. L.J. 1155, 1159–62
(2009).
226. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 223–24 (2009).
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and lesbian discrimination in the “garb” of something else. To quote
Edward Stein, each “closets, rather than confronts, homophobia.”227
Casting exclusionary marriage laws as a liberty violation rather
than an equality violation of gays and lesbians also “closets rather
than confronts, homophobia”228—as well as its targets. In so doing,
the liberty argument reflects a centuries-old legal tradition of not
“naming” gays and lesbians229—a legal tradition embraced in Bowers
v. Hardwick230 and only moderately rejected in Lawrence v. Texas,231
one of the Court’s most pro-gay-rights decisions to date. To be sure,
suppressing the equality demands of all identity groups, not just those
of sexual minorities, has the effect of covering those groups.
However, suppressing the equality demands of gays and lesbians in
particular—and thereby covering their identity—is arguably worse
given gays’ unique history of covering (and of being covered).
A reading of the Supreme Court’s most recent gay rights case,
United States v. Windsor,232 suggests that the Court has continued this
long tradition of covering gay identity. It is worth briefly looking at
Windsor because it at once departs from Yoshino’s theory and
reinforces it. Windsor strikes down section 3 of DOMA primarily on
equality, not liberty, grounds—thus suggesting that Yoshino erred in
his prediction that the Supreme Court would continue to lead with

227. Stein, supra note 225, at 504.
228. Id.
229. Sodomy—the behavioral metonym of gay identity—was long known as the “crime
that shall not be named.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215. For
commentary on sodomy as the metonym of gay identity, see Janet E. Halley, Reasoning
About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721,
1722 (1993). As recently as 1986, the Supreme Court invoked that trope to refer to what it
understood to be gay sex, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring), a description of which the Court relegated to a place “named after the foot,
that lowly organ which spends its life near the ground, in the dirt,” J.M. Balkin, The
Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 273, 275 (1989). And even though Lawrence v. Texas
overruled Bowers and brought the definition of sodomy from footnote to text, see
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), it, too, participated in that tradition of unnaming by discussing the “conduct,” but even more so the “right” at issue in that case, in
such an oblique and abstract way that it is often difficult to tell what, exactly, the Lawrence
majority is saying, see Heather Gerken, supra note 215, at 847 (stating that the opening of
the majority opinion in Lawrence is “lovely” but then asking: “But what on earth does it
mean?”); Mary Anne Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SUP. CT.
REV. 75, 75–77; Tribe, supra note 105, at 1898–99.
230. 476 U.S. at 196–97.
231. 539 U.S. at 578–79; see also Eyer, supra note 148, at 8 (arguing that Lawrence at
most represents a jurisprudence of “tolerance”—not one of full “recognition”).
232. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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liberty in future civil rights cases, as it did in Lawrence.233 By
mentioning the word “equality” and its variants more than a dozen
times throughout its opinion, the majority strongly suggests that it was
deciding Windsor on the basis of equality, or of what it calls “equal
dignity.”234
At the same time, though, Windsor could also be read as the
Court’s attempt to quell pluralism anxiety by covering gay identity—
in the same way that universalizing liberty arguments, which omit any
reference to “gays” and “lesbians,” do. Aside from three moments
where the majority quotes from DOMA’s legislative record,235 it
nowhere mentions the words “gay, “lesbian,” “homosexuality,” or
their variants; as Noa Ben-Asher has recently observed, Windsor is
“striking for . . . the conspicuous absence of the words ‘homosexual,’
‘lesbian,’ or ‘bisexual,’ ”236 particularly striking in light of the fact that
its named plaintiff, Edith Windsor, argued that DOMA discriminated
against her on the basis of sexual orientation.237 The majority opinion
does not argue, as the Second Circuit did,238 that section 3 harms gays
and lesbians, notwithstanding the fact that “moral disapproval of
homosexuality” was very much on Congress’s mind when it passed
section 3—language from the legislative record that not only came up

233. But see NeJaime, supra note 108, at 220 (arguing that while the Windsor majority
technically struck down section 3 on equal protection grounds, it is “conceptually, if not
doctrinally, a right-to-marry case”).
234. To be sure, in invoking the “equal dignity of same-sex marriages,” the Windsor
Court adverted to a concept with close associations to liberty: dignity. According to
Laurence Tribe, “dignity” is the concept that unites the two interlocking strands of the
Fourteenth Amendment: equality and liberty. See Tribe, supra note 105, at 1898. Yoshino
refers to hybrid liberty and equality claims as “dignity” claims, thus suggesting that he
would interpret Windsor as resting its holding, at least in part, on liberty. See Yoshino, The
New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 749. That said, Yoshino makes a distinction
between “liberty-based” and “equality-based” dignity claims, depending “on whether the
liberty or the equality dimension of the hybrid claim is ascendant.” Id. Given the Windsor
majority’s repeated references to equality and “equal dignity,” as well as its reliance on
canonical equal protection precedents like Moreno and Romer, it seems safe to say that it
is one such case where equality was in the ascendant. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681–93.
235. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
236. See Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal
Homosexual, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 243, 245 (2014). Ben-Asher further argues that
“Windsor introduces us to the new legal homosexual: the ‘same-sex couple.’ ” Id. She later
refers to this rhetorical strategy as an erasure of “the terms ‘homosexual’ [and] ‘lesbian’ ”
and ultimately homosexual identity. Id. at 263.
237. Brief on the Merits for Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 17, Windsor, 133 S.
Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307).
238. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185–88 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that sexual
minorities constituted a quasi-suspect class under the federal Equal Protection Clause and
striking down section 3 under heightened judicial scrutiny), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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during Windsor’s oral argument but also was cited directly by the
Windsor majority.239 Nor does it recognize that marriage prohibitions
like section 3 warrant heightened scrutiny because they harm a class
which deserves that level of review—a finding made by several state
and federal courts around the country in myriad gay rights contexts.240
Rather, the majority argues that section 3 harms married samesex couples and interferes with the “equal dignity of same-sex
marriages.” Gays and lesbians are alluded to only obliquely in dyadic
terms as composing the “couple, whose moral and sexual choices the
Constitution protects, see Lawrence.”241 The targeted class, in other
words, is not gays and lesbians, but rather the relationships into which
they presumptively enter.242 Nowhere does the Court acknowledge
that marriage discrimination of this kind is relational discrimination,
and that relational discrimination of this kind is gay and lesbian
discrimination.243 This omission is curious in light of the fact that both
the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have found that
discrimination against same-sex relationships is synonymous with
discrimination against gays and lesbians.244 In so doing, the Court
(and lower courts) has suggested that relational discrimination and
status discrimination is a distinction without a difference.

239. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 16 (1996)).
240. See, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 334 (D. Conn.
2012) (finding that “homosexuals warrant judicial recognition as a suspect classification”
although striking down DOMA under rational basis review only); Golinski v. U.S. Office
of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 985–90 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Varnum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 885–96 (Iowa 2009).
241. 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
242. In this sense, the Windsor Court embraces an “entity” rather than “associational”
view of marriage, similar to the approach currently taken in the law of partnership. See
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 201 (amended 1997), 6 U.L.A. 91 (2001).
243. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships,
Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100
CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1196 (2012) (making this argument).
244. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 689 (2010) (“declin[ing] to distinguish between status and
conduct in this context [of sexual orientation]”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575
(2003) (finding that discrimination on the basis of “homosexual conduct” constitutes
discrimination against gays and lesbians as a class); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1081
(9th Cir. 2012) (finding that “marriage” discrimination constitutes discrimination against
gays and lesbians as a class), vacated sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652,
2659 (2013); Bishop v. United States ex. rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1287 (N.D.
Okla. 2014) (stating that discrimination on the basis of a “same-sex marriage” amounts to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation because the conduct, same-sex marriage,
“is so closely correlated with being homosexual that sexual orientation provides the best
descriptor for the class-based distinction being drawn”).
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Windsor’s peculiar reasoning “covers” sexual orientation identity
no less than universalizing liberty arguments do and therefore
illustrates what we believe is problematic about judicial arguments
that effectively closet the very class that seeks constitutional redress.
The only time the Court comes close to recognizing that DOMA
harms gay and lesbian persons rather than just “same-sex marriages”
is when it says that “the principal purpose and necessary effect of this
law [DOMA] are to demean those persons who are in a lawful samesex marriage.”245 But even here one wonders why Justice Kennedy did
not just say who, precisely, “those persons”246 are. Moreover, it seems
rather uncontroversial to say that another “necessary effect” of
DOMA is to “demean” even “those persons” who are not in a “lawful
same-sex marriage”247 but whom DOMA nevertheless symbolically
touches: all gays and lesbians, an entire class of persons rendered
presumptively unfit for marriage under DOMA.
Covering over sexual orientation identity in this way—and in the
way that Yoshino’s theory appears to require—elides the history of
discrimination that underwrites and motivates both DOMA and other
laws that discriminate against gays and lesbians. We are wary of
judicial covering of this sort, failing as it does “to make significant
moral claims”248 about the status of gays and lesbians in American
society as well as about why laws that exclude them from various
spheres of American public life warrant condemnation. We agree
with Yoshino that the language in which courts vindicate the rights of
the subjects before them matters,249 but we disagree with him as to
why that is so. In his view, language ought to serve the goal of gaining
a right (say, marriage) in a way that is unobjectionable to the
people—in a way that assuages, rather than incites, pluralism anxiety
(and possibly backlash as well). In our view, language ought to serve
the goal of gaining a right (say, marriage) in a way that vindicates the
dignity of those individuals who seek it. Indeed, “even if advocates
may feel compelled to offer every argument that might persuade a
court, judges, in selecting among those arguments, have a choice
about the language and the light in which they cast the subjects who

245. 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Stein, supra note 225, at 505.
249. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 793–94 (discussing the
ramifications of framing the marriage-equality claim as an equality right for gays and
lesbians or as a liberty right that is universally enjoyed).
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appear before them.”250 We strongly reject a choice that hides subjects
behind the universalizing rhetoric of liberty.
Thus, even if we did find strong support for the idea that the
rhetoric of liberty has a purchase that the rhetoric of equality lacks,
we believe that there is still good reason to reject Yoshino’s tactical
advice.251 Rather than submerge equality in favor of liberty, we favor
the doctrinal strategy relied on by the Executive Branch—which
repudiated DOMA for reasons relating to equality, not liberty, in its
2011 announcement252—as well as by most federal courts that have
struck down exclusionary marriage laws, including DOMA.253
B.

Liberty As Bias Avoidance

Our second normative objection concerns the issue of implicit
bias and how best to manage it. As already mentioned, implicit bias
might explain why we found a negative effect of both the liberty
rationale and the equality rationale when compared to the neutral
rationale. In addition, implicit bias might explain why equality-based
rationales had more negative effects than did liberty-based rationales
(albeit only at the margins). If people do react negatively to equalitybased reasoning because such reasoning triggers unconscious bias

250. Ben-Asher, supra note 236, at 284.
251. We are reminded of an observation made by Michael Sandel nearly twenty-five
years ago, also in the context of gay rights. Sandel argued then that the “neutral case for
toleration [of homosexuality]” is undesirable because it “leaves wholly unchallenged the
adverse views of homosexuality itself.” Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal
Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 537 (1989). “Unless those
views can be plausibly addressed,” he maintained,
even a Court ruling in their favor is unlikely to win for homosexuals more than a
thin and fragile toleration. A fuller respect would require, if not admiration, at
least some appreciation of the lives homosexuals live. Such appreciation, however,
is unlikely to be cultivated by a legal and political discourse conducted in terms of
autonomy rights alone.
Id. In this sense, liberty arguments reflect what Eskridge has called a politics of
“toleration” rather than one of “recognition.” See William Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s
Jurisprudence of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1086 (2004).
252. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to Hon. John A. Boehner,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
253. See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (striking down
section 3 of DOMA under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution), aff’d,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 347 (D.
Conn. 2012) (striking down section 3 of DOMA under the Equal Protection Clause);
Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (striking
down section 3 of DOMA under the Equal Protection Clause).
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against same-sex marriage, sexual minorities, or both, then Yoshino’s
suggestion that courts downplay the equality claims of discrete
identity groups when vindicating those groups’ civil rights254 might be
read as a strategy of bias-avoidance or bias-containment. Thus
understood, Yoshino’s suggested strategy is unappealing because it
urges courts to do the very thing—avoid confrontation with anxietyprovoking identity categories—that implicit bias scholarship cautions
against.
If first generation implicit bias scholarship aimed to show that
implicit bias not only exists but also influences behavior, then second
generation implicit bias scholarship—where we are today—aims to
devise the best way to manage it.255 Scholars from a number of fields
have recently argued that the optimal way to deal with implicit bias is
to confront, rather than evade, the identity categories that precipitate
it.256 For instance, in their work on race and juries, Samuel Sommers
and Phoebe Ellsworth have found that white jurors who attempt to
avoid seeing race in cases involving white and black parties—that is,
jurors who champion the ideal of colorblindness—are actually more
biased in those cases.257 Indeed, Sommers and Ellsworth have found
that there is something about trying to avoid confrontation with the
category of race that makes people more racially biased.258
Conversely, when white jurors suspend the colorblindness ideal and
confront race, they are less racially biased.259

254. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 796 (arguing that
“[e]quality claims inevitably involve the Court in picking favorites among groups, a
practice attended by pluralism anxiety” whereas “[l]iberty claims, in contrast, emphasize
what all Americans (or, more precisely, all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States) have in common”).
255. See Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 88, at 1126 (stating in 2012 that “[g]iven the
substantial and growing scientific literature on implicit bias, the time has now come to
confront a critical question: What, if anything, should we do about implicit bias in the
courtroom?”); John Powell & Rachel Godsil, Implicit Bias Insights As Preconditions to
Structural Change, POVERTY & RACE, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 3.
256. See infra notes 259–68 and accompanying text.
257. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom:
Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1367, 1374 (2000); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in
Juror Decision-Making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 599, 608 (2009); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White
Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American
Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 218 (2001) [hereinafter Sommers &
Ellsworth, White Juror Bias].
258. See Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra note 257, at 225.
259. Id.
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Other scholars have similarly found that “actively contemplating
others’ psychological experiences weakens the automatic expression
of racial biases.”260 For instance, white individuals who adopt the
perspective of black individuals—who place themselves in the
proverbial shoes of the latter—are less likely to exhibit automatic bias
against them.261 Based on these and other studies, legal commentators
have argued that judges ought to encourage juries “to be conscious of
race, gender, and other social categories.”262 They point to “evidence
[that] suggests that it is precisely this greater degree of discussion, and
even confrontation [with social categories], that can potentially
decrease the amount of biased decisionmaking.”263 These kinds of
“perspective-taking interventions,” scholars observe, “substantially
decreased implicit bias in the form of negative attitudes.”264 Their
recommendations are consistent with those of law-and-mind scholars
like Terry Maroney, who has argued that judges are their most
effective when they consciously and deliberately engage, rather than
evade, uncomfortable emotions and the stimuli that provoke them.265
They are also consistent with empirical data that show that
“consciously held beliefs and values about equality . . . can override
the effect of automatically activated prejudice . . . toward
outgroups.”266
Yoshino’s proposal deviates from the debiasing interventions
suggested above. Rather than engage with social categories like race,
gender, and sexual orientation, Yoshino’s tactical advice encourages
judges to avoid those categories in order to serve the larger goal of
managing the public’s pluralism anxiety—or, as we suspect, its
implicit bias, given the likely relationship between those two things.
Where implicit bias experts advocate direct engagement with the
social categories that precipitate implicit bias in order to decrease it,
Yoshino advocates the muting of those same categories in order to
avoid it. In this sense, Yoshino’s suggested strategy does nothing to

260. Kang, Implicit Bias, supra note 88, at 1185 (summarizing this research).
261. Id. (observing that “perspective-taking interventions substantially decreased
implicit bias in the form of negative attitudes, as measured by both a variant of the
standard IAT (the personalized IAT) and the standard race attitude IAT”).
262. Id. at 1184.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1185.
265. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 1485, 1492 (2011).
266. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, From Automatic Antigay Prejudice to
Behavior: The Moderating Role of Conscious Beliefs About Gender and Behavioral
Control, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 268, 277 (2006).
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address implicit bias (or, in his words, “anxiety”)—and, ironically,
might even perpetuate it.267
To be sure, we are not suggesting that Supreme Court opinions
ought to function as debiasing devices. Indeed, the primary purpose
of Court decisions is to “say what the law is,”268 not to cure the
public’s implicit bias against social outgroups like sexual minorities.
That said, we object to Yoshino’s recommendation not because
we think that it will ultimately fail to remedy Americans’ implicit bias.
Rather, we object to his recommendation because we do not think
that judges, among other legal actors, ought to be encouraged to
engage in bias-minimizing strategies. Perhaps it is very well true that
few people read Supreme Court opinions and even fewer understand
them. Our study provides at least some support for that proposition
(given the extremely low level of subject comprehension that we
found); in that sense, our study coheres with a wealth of social science
data that paint a rather dim picture of the relationship between
Supreme Court opinions and the public’s engagement with them.269
That does not mean, however, that the nation’s most respected
branch of government270 ought to be embracing strategies that
perpetuate implicit prejudice against outgroups—or, at the very least,
strategies that do very little to eliminate that prejudice. Given the
judiciary’s perceived stature in American public life, we believe that it
ought to lead by example—and that minimizing the salient
characteristics of groups when vindicating their civil rights is less than
exemplary.

267. If colorblindness can perpetuate (rather than alleviate) racial bias, as scholars
have found, then it is at the very least conceivable that decisions committed to “social
category blindness” do not just fail to alleviate bias but even perpetuate it on some level.
We understand that the results of our study do not strongly support this claim. If, as we
found, Supreme Court reasoning does not really affect public acceptance of a decision,
then it is unlikely that Supreme Court reasoning would affect implicit bias. If people are
not affected by reasons in terms of acceptance, then it is unlikely that they will be affected
by reasons in terms of implicit bias. That said, we are mostly concerned here with
Yoshino’s belief that the Court cares about pluralism anxiety (and, by implication, implicit
bias)—both its own and that of the people. If that is right, then we believe that the Court
at the very least ought to engage the best strategy to manage that bias. If implicit bias
scholars are right, then the best strategy is one that engages, rather than deflects, the social
categories that purportedly trigger bias.
268. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
269. See supra notes 110–44 and accompanying text.
270. See Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 12, at 754 n.55.
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CONCLUSION
Our study tested empirically a theoretical claim commonly made
by scholars of constitutional law: that Supreme Court reasoning
matters in the court of public opinion. The most recent version of this
claim comes from Professor Kenji Yoshino, who argues that courts
can alleviate pluralism anxiety, and presumably contain public
backlash, in decisions vindicating civil rights by leading with liberty
and downplaying equality in those decisions. Our intuition was that
Yoshino’s belief in the power of judicial reasoning was wrong as a
positive matter. If, as Professors Braman and Fontana recently found,
the public does not really care about which institutional actor resolves
a high salience issue, then why would it care about something even
more nuanced and granular, namely how an issue is decided? If that
intuition is correct, then Yoshino’s tactical advice to courts is not only
normatively undesirable (as we believe and argue) but also
descriptively inaccurate.
Our results do not alter our intuition. Yoshino’s tactical advice to
courts—that they lead with liberty in order to quell the public’s
pluralism anxiety—is not robustly endorsed by our results, since we
do not find that liberty increases acceptance or agreement when
compared to a no-rationale decision. Nor do we find the negative
effects of equality significantly pervasive to convince us that equality
is that much worse than liberty (indeed, if anything, our results
suggest that both are bad in terms of decreasing public support).
Perhaps most important, even if Yoshino is correct that liberty does a
better job than equality in containing backlash, his advice must be
weighed against the significant normative concerns that follow from
it—particularly when it comes to gay rights.
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gender. In response, opponents have argued that the Constitution only
protects traditional marriages and families, and that same-sex marriage
is not mentioned in the Constitution. These opponents have argued that
a Supreme Court decision protecting marriage between same-sex
couples would be unwise.
The Supreme Court held oral arguments on marriage between
same-sex couples, which were presented by the lawyers for same-sex
marriage advocacy groups and by the lawyers for groups opposing
same-sex marriage. After these arguments were presented to the Court,
the members of the Court engaged in private discussions about the
case.
Just a few days ago, the Supreme Court decided the case—and
advocates of marriage for same-sex couples are very pleased. The new
decision requires the federal government and state governments to
permit same-sex couples to marry. The Supreme Court’s decision stated
that everyone should be able to marry the person of their choice under
the Constitution. Marriage, the Court declared, is a fundamental right
for all adults and laws that prohibit same-sex marriage violate that right.
Advocates of marriage for same-sex couples praised the new
decision as a “major step forwards in the history of American civil rights
and a vindication of the Constitution” while opponents criticized the
decision as a “blow to the people and traditions of the United States
and to the importance of the institution of traditional marriage.”
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and families, and that same-sex marriage is not mentioned in the
Constitution. These opponents have argued that a Supreme Court
decision protecting marriage between same-sex couples would be
unwise.
The Supreme Court held oral arguments on marriage between same-sex
couples, which were presented by the lawyers for same-sex marriage
advocacy groups and by the lawyers for groups opposing same-sex
marriage. After these arguments were presented to the Court, the
members of the Court engaged in private discussions about the case.
Just a few days ago, the Supreme Court decided the case—and
advocates of marriage for same-sex couples are very pleased. The new
decision requires the federal government and state governments to
permit same-sex couples to marry. The Supreme Court’s decision stated
that the Constitution prohibits the government from discriminating
against people by singling them out for differential treatment on the
basis of a particular characteristic—which is exactly what the
government does when it prohibits gay people from marrying the person
of their choice because they are gay.
Advocates of marriage for same-sex couples praised the new
decision as a “major step forward in the history of American civil rights
and a vindication of the Constitution” while opponents criticized the
decision as a “blow to the people and traditions of the United States
and to the importance of the institution of traditional marriage.”
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